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Customary international law ("CIL") forms the foundation of
international law.' It is the source of such basic principles as
tAssociate Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Washington
University (St. Louis); J.D., Harvard Law School. I would like to thank my colleagues,
Jared Goldstein, Diana Hassel, and Colleen Murphy for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft.
I As Professor Henkin stated: "The core of traditional international law and its
principal assumptions and foundations have been unwritten 'customary law,' made over
time by widespread practice of governments acting from a sense of legal obligation."
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. XXXVII
territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality among nations. 2 Its
formulation is quite simple: CIL "results from the general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation."' Yet, there is considerable disagreement as to its
formation and content. An influential observer once noted that the
development of CIL is shrouded in "mystery and illogic;"4 another
described the theory and doctrine of CIL as an "incoherent...
mess."' Despite its ancient origins, CIL is still poorly explained,
Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 33 (2d ed. 1979).
Professor Kelsen wrote: "Custom is the older and the original source of international
law, of particular as well as of general international law." HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (1952).
2 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21
(2005).
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(2) (1987). A useful view of CIL is as follows:
The modern paradigm of customary international legal theory can be stated
simply as follows: CIL is formed by the general and consistent practices of
states accepted by them as law. CIL binds all states. New members of the
international community of states are bound by existing customary law.
However, an existing state is not bound by emerging customary law if it
persistently objects.
J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449,
499 (2000).
4 ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4
(1971). Part of the problem results from the fact that the making of CIL may be
"informal, haphazard, not deliberate even partly unintentional and fortuitous." HENKIN,
supra note 1, at 34.
5 Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L.
115, 116-17 (2005) ("Some scholars complain that [CIL] is incoherent, others assert that
it is irrelevant or a fiction, and virtually everyone agrees that the theory and doctrine of
CIL is a mess."). Kelly had a more scathing criticism of CIL. He observed, "[T]here is
neither a common understanding of how customary international legal norms are formed,
nor agreement on the content of those norms." Kelly, supra note 3, at 450. He went on
to state:
The theory of CIL is, in fact, so undefined and controversial that it does not
permit the relatively objective determination of norms, lacks a ritual to mark the
normative moment, is inconsistent and incoherent, and does not possess an
agreed form to qualify as a secondary rule of recognition. Simply put, we
cannot identify customary norms because there is neither a common
understanding of how to determine CIL, nor is there an adequate means of
determining whether or not the asserted substantive norms of CIL have, in fact,
been accepted as binding. It [is] not surprising then that CIL norms are
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and commentators continue their attempts to provide a coherent
explanation.6
Many of the attempts to explain CIL are based on analogies to
the law of contracts, with States likened to parties entering into
express or implied contracts. Professor Hans Kelsen observed
that "most of the writers on international law maintain that the
international community is based on a contract. . . ."' This widely
accepted approach suggests that CIL is the result of the exercise of
sovereign state autonomy, free will, and consent.9 The resort to
such words triggers the law of contracts.'" Other prominent
scholars have explicitly analogized the formation of CIL to the
making of contracts." The appeal of contracts in international law
6 See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 11, 13 (1999) ("[S]imple game theoretical
concepts . . . explain how CIL arise [sic], why nations 'comply' with CIL as commonly
understood, and how CIL changes.").
7 See discussion infra Part III.
8 KELSEN, supra note 1, at 316.
9 See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 351 (Anders
Wedberg trans., 1946) (noting commentators' efforts to "trace back all international law
to the 'free will' of the State"). Indeed, the Permanent Court of International Justice
stated:
The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will
as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these
co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of
common aims.
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, 144 (Sept. 7).
10 For example, scholar P.S. Atiyah stated, "The autonomy of the free choice of
private parties to make their own contracts on their own terms was the central feature of
classical contract law." P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 408
(1979). In a similar vein, scholar Michael Trebilcock so described the phenomenon:
"[T]he Will or Autonomy Theory of Contract Law, where obligations by individuals to
one another arise out of voluntarily assumed, self-imposed obligations reflecting
convergent intentions of the contracting parties." MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 241 (1993).
11 Professors Robert E. Scott and Paul B. Stephan wrote: "We believe that contract
theory (an umbrella phrase that we use to describe both the law and economics of
contracts as well as the separate discipline of the economics of contract) explains much
of current practice regarding the enforcement of international law." ROBERT E. SCOTT &
PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN, CONTRACT THEORY AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at vii (2006). With regard to CIL, in particular,
they wrote: "[A] growing body of international law, both treaty-based and customary,
does entail commitments that require the joint production of collective welfare and thus
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
is traceable to the heavy influence of John Locke and Thomas
Hobbes. 12  This reliance (perhaps overreliance) on the notion of
social contract is understandable given that it underpins
contemporary Western liberal thought, while international law (for
better or worse) is also dominated by a Western orientation.
Nevertheless, this reliance gives rise to a false dichotomy in
structuring the understanding of CIL. The structure is presented as
a binary choice between state of nature, on the one hand, and
contract-based ordering, on the other. The purpose of this paper is
to suggest that other choices may be available.
The conventional view overlooks the foundational question of
whether an explanation of CIL based on contract principles is
pertinent or helpful. There are strong arguments that it is.13 I take
a contrary view. I contend that the framework of contract analysis
is an ill-fitting, largely inapplicable model to explain the behavior
of nations. Contract-based theory does not accurately describe the
formation of CIL. For a theory to have any coherence, it should
possess some level of descriptive accuracy. A contract-based
analysis largely fails in this regard. Indeed, its asserted validity is
based on obvious fictions.
Determining the basis of CIL is important because, at its core,
it is a manifestation of underlying normative principles. To
paraphrase Professor Kelsen, custom does not create law; instead,
presents the same fundamental enforcement dilemma that parties face when entering into
contracts." Id. at 30.
12 JAMES M. DONOVAN, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 36 (2008). In
describing the influence of Locke and Hobbes, Donovan wrote:
Society brought its adopted government into existence by an imagined social
contract. Within these theories, the central issue was not the duties owed by
man to the state and its law but what rights the citizens possessed, the protection
of which had occasioned the need to move out of the state of nature and to join
in the contract to create civilization.
Id. The influence of Locke and Hobbes on theories of international law is reflected in
the contemporary literature. See, e.g., Matthew Lister, The Legitimating Role of Consent
in International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 663, 665 (2011) (stating the author shall "make
use of a Lockean social contract account to show why actual consent is necessary to
legitimize large parts of international law").
13 See, e.g., MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 44-45 (5th ed. 2008)
(analogizing the theory of CIL to implied contracts); ScoTT & STEPHAN, supra note 11,
at 29 ("[T]he process by which international law is made [including CIL] is, for our
purposes, akin to the process by which people make binding commitments by forming
contracts.").
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it is evidence of a legal norm." This norm is created by something
other than custom: "[T]he true creator of law stands-so to
speak-behind custom."" So what is it that stands behind
custom? The conventional view clings to the assertion that it is
contract-that contract forms the basis of custom, and custom
becomes law.16 If contract fails to provide a coherent, organizing
foundation for CIL, then it means that our understanding of CIL is
fundamentally flawed. Any attempt to understand or explain CIL
must first identify its foundational principles.
Instead of looking to contract, I suggest that the analysis
should look to the basis of social ordering before contract: status.
My analysis draws upon Henry Maine's famous observation that
"the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a
movement from Status to Contract."" By this, he meant that
many pre-modern societies were organized and governed under
principles of status relationships." A century later, Max
Gluckman, a leading anthropologist, endorsed Maine's view of
societal development: "This generalization [that societies move
from status to contract] is among the most important which
scholars have advanced to cover a sweeping movement in human
history." 9 Examples of status-based societies include tribal
societies in which each person's role was determined by
immutable characteristics such as blood relationship, age, and
gender.20 At some point, many societies evolved from
14 KELSEN, supra note 1, at 309.
'5 Id.
16 See id at 314-16.
17 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (Transaction Publishers 2002) (1861)
(emphasis in original).
18 Id at 113-70.
19 MAX GLUCKMAN, POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY 48 (1965).
"[Maine] saw the major development of society as from a state in which its law was
dominated by status, to a state in which the law was dominated by contract, a
generalization which has been validated by subsequent research . . . ... Id. at 17-18.
Gluckman reiterated this point with his observation that "it is certain that the tribal-type
antedated the differentiated society in the whole march of human history." Id. at 81.
Simply put, primitive society was dominated by status. Id. at xxi. Gluckman is
recognized as one of the leading scholars in the field of legal anthropology. See
DONOVAN, supra note 12, at 100-11.
20 See GLUCKMAN, supra note 19, at 19, 48-49.
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organization based on status relationships to organization based on
contract.2 1 In this sense, individuals were unbound from the
constraints of status and became free to establish their own place
in society based upon the exercise of personal autonomy through
exchange relationships.2 2 In Western Europe, this movement was
seen in the transition from feudal, land-based social ordering to the
rise of the market economy.2 3
The conventional description of CIL adopts the view that
nations establish their legal relationships through contract-like
behavior. This view asserts that nations, through their free and
autonomous actions, order their relationships through conduct akin
to bargaining and consent.24  Thus, a rule of CIL is formed when
one or more nations engage in conduct to establish the rule (what
might be viewed as an offer), and if other nations do not object to
21 MAINE, supra note 17, at 113-70.
22 Maine's observation may be viewed as a variation on the theme of the ever-
present conflict between individual versus group needs. As Donovan wrote:
The need for norms that limit the range of possible actions by group members
should be apparent. Despite the fact that group life satisfies requirements that
could not otherwise be met, each individual continues to have his or her own
objectives, desires, aspirations, and other personal motivations. The central
tendency of those private goals is to the drive the group - be it the family, clan,
or even city or state - apart. These can be termed the centrifugal social forces.
We can expand on this metaphor from physics. In order to overcome forces that
would disperse the group, there must be countervailing forces to hold it
together. These are the centripetal forces of social regulation. Social
regulation involves inculcating within group members the norms of acceptable
behavior, goals, aspirations, and even emotions while allowing venting of
inevitable frustrations, angers, and conflicts in ways that do not threaten the
long-term stability of the group.
DONOVAN, supra note 12, at 11 (emphasis in original). These forces, and the inherent
conflict between the individual and the group, are embedded in the models of status and
contract. Donovan expressly acknowledged this point in his discussion of Maine's
theories:
The original condition of society, [Maine] claimed "was not what it is assumed
to be at present, a collection of individuals. In fact, and in the view of the men
who composed it, it was an aggregation of families. The contrast may be most
forcibly expressed by saying that the unit of an ancient society was the Family,
of a modem society the Individual."
Id. at 42 (quoting MAINE, supra note 17, at 126) (emphasis in original).
23 See, e.g., JANIS, supra note 13, at 167-69 (describing the effect of the Peace of
Westphalia on the end of the feudal system and the rise of the sovereign state).
24 See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 1, at 314-16.
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the conduct or accept, then the rule is established as CIL (as if a
contract has been formed).25
I contend that the development of CIL is more plausibly
explained by viewing the behavior of nations through a status-
based analysis. By doing so, the analysis abandons the awkward
fiction that nations act like contracting parties and that all nations
possess the autonomy to participate in the formation of CIL.
Status-based theory provides a better description of CIL because it
reflects and explains the actual interaction among nations. Some
nations hold a status that others do not, and nations of a more
powerful status determine the development of CIL. Thus, it is not
agreement or consent that lies at the heart of CIL. Rather, it is the
status of nations, which is largely reflected in power differences.
As simple as this thesis may be, the overwhelming weight of the
scholarly commentary adopts the contract-based approach, and
little, if any, attention is paid to the possibility of status as the first
principle.2 6 This raises the question of why there is such a blind
adherence to the theory of contract, even when its adherents freely
admit the incoherence of the theory.
To develop this thesis, Part II begins with a brief summary of
CIL. Part III examines why the language of contract holds such an
allure to those who attempt to explain CIL and then discusses the
problems with using contract in this manner. It is widely, if not
universally, acknowledged that the attempts to explain CIL
through contract rely on an elaborate set of fictions that simply are
not true. These fictions are crucial to the contract-based analysis,
which means that the analytical framework of CIL, insofar as it is
explained by contract, is based more on fantasy than reality.
Part IV presents status as an alternative to contract to explain
CIL. History shows that only a few nations have had the
capability to form or heavily influence CIL.2 7 All such nations
have possessed unique features of status (primarily in the form of
military power and imperial reach), and I contend that it has been
their status that has been the crucial element in CIL. The
25 Cf id. at 254 (describing formation of law).
26 See, e.g., id. at 316.
27 See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1158-60 (describing how the United
States and England used threats and force to enforce the three-mile rule for territorial
claims at sea).
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discussion also responds to critics of Maine's theory and explores
the possible reasons why status has been neglected as a theoretical
model to inform the discussion of CIL. The most likely reason
appears to be the view that status implies the presence of power
and coercion in guiding behavior. The reluctance to acknowledge
such forces in the formation of CIL appears to explain why
contract-based theory is the favored approach. The incoherence of
contract-based theory, though, is exposed by the historical origins
of modern international law. The history of modern international
law, in general, and CIL, in particular, is inseparable and results
from the exercise of coercion and status by colonial powers, as
explained by commentators who have pointed out the ethnocentric
biases and assumptions that formed international legal theory.28
To demonstrate the viability and validity of my status-based
theory, Part IV then proceeds to two analytical exercises. First, it
examines the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.
This opinion is illuminating because the analysis and arguments in
that matter are better explained by a status-based model of CIL
rather than a contract-based model. Second, Part IV also presents
a hypothetical to demonstrate that the development of CIL
depends not on agreement but on the identity of the nations
driving the development.
Part V discusses the need to reconcile the existence of status
with a contract-based model in order to develop a more nuanced
and coherent view of CIL. The problem with relying on contract
as the sole or overwhelming determinant in the formation of CIL
is that every principle of CIL is thereby legitimated by the (largely
false) argument that it is the product of consent. Such a view
marginalizes nations that are unable to play an active role in the
development of CIL by not providing an account of their role or
place. Recognizing the role of status provides a more coherent
alternative to the tautology that every principle of CIL is
legitimate because it is the result of agreement because agreement
is the basis of CIL. Part VI concludes this paper.
II. A Brief Summary of Customary International Law
There are two primary sources of international law: treaties
28 See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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and CIL.29 CIL is regarded as "the oldest and the original source
of international law."3 0 One of the early, influential commentators
described CIL as "certain maxims and customs consecrated by
long use, and observed by nations in their mutual intercourse with
each other as a kind of law.""1 According to Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, international custom
is "evidence of a general practice accepted as law."32  For a
practice to rise to the level of CIL, it must: (1) be followed as a
general practice (an objective element); and (2) it must be
accepted as law.33 The second of these components is viewed as a
29 D'AMATO, supra note 4, at 4; see also Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at
1113.
30 HENRY J. STEINER, DETLEV F. VAGTS & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS, MATERIALS AND TEXT 232 (4th ed. 1994) (quoting I Oppenheim,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-26 (8th ed. 1955)). Until the 1900s, CIL was the principal form
of international law. JANIS, supra note 13, at 44; see also Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu
Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 208 (2010) ("Before
the twentieth century, CIL was the principal form of international law.").
31 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, at XV
(Joseph Chitty trans., T. & J. Johson & Co. 1916) (1758). In nineteenth century
American legal culture, Vattel was regarded as the primary authority on international
law. See Kelly, supra note 3, at 510.
32 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b).
33 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 16 (3d ed. 2010);
Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1116. Another view lists four criteria for CIL: "(1)
'concordant practice' by a number of states relating to a particular situation; (2)
continuation of that practice over a 'considerable period of time'; (3) a conception that
the practice is required by or consistent with international law; and (4) general
acquiescence in that practice by other states." STEINER, VAGTS & KOH, supra note 30, at
240. These are not "hard" criteria, and many principles of CIL do not meet all four
criteria.
Again, these criteria are simple to state, but ultimately give rise to thorny, intractable
questions. For example, "there is no agreement on the amount of consistency of practice
that is required" and "it is difficult to determine how widespread the practice must be."
Guzman, supra note 5, at 124, 125. There is also little agreement as to which types of
actions constitute state practice. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1117. State
practice may be evidenced in the form of governmental policy statements, legislation,
diplomatic correspondence, treaties, United Nations General Assembly resolutions and
other nonbinding statements and resolutions by multilateral bodies. See GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra note 2, at 23. Nevertheless, do they each hold the same weight? Are
some forms of these state actions more binding than others? What if a government says
one thing in its official policy statements but does something else in practice?
Furthermore, what is a considerable period of time? The problem with this question is
exacerbated by the fact that many observers believe CIL "can change in a moment,
6172012]
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subjective or psychological element, and is known as opinio
juris.34 In sum, the widely accepted view among scholars is that
CIL is the product of "implicit state consent," and CIL rules "form
because states engage in or acquiesce in particular practices and
eventually recognize them as obligatory."3 5
For purposes of CIL (and international law in general), States
are the primary actors, as opposed to individuals or other non-state
entities.3 6 A foundational principle regarding States is that each
State is equal in law and autonomous.37 This notion of sovereign
equality has been a feature of international law since the
emergence of the modern concept of the State.3 8 Thus, Andorra
and Lichtenstein possess the same legal rights as, and enjoy
sovereign equality with, the United States and China.39
creating what can be referred to as 'instant custom."' Guzman, supra note 5, at 157. An
example of "instant custom" was the principle of sovereignty over air space which was
accepted as CIL after the start of World War I. See Igor I. Lukashuk, Customary Norms
in Contemporary International Law, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE
THRESHOLD OF THE 2 1 ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KRSYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSK 487,
504 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).
34 BEDERMAN, supra note 33, at 17; Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1116.
35 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 78 (2d ed. 2006).
36 BEDERMAN, supra note 33, at 52. The concept of the modem state may be traced
to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which concluded the Thirty Years War. See MARK
W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 36-37
(4th ed. 2011). The treaties memorializing the Peace recognized the right of sovereigns
to govern their people free of outside interference. See JANIS, supra note 13, at 168.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention set forth the now widely-accepted elements of
statehood: "The state as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and
(d) capacity to enter into relations with other states." BEDERMAN, supra note 33, at 53.
37 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, 1.
38 See, e.g., id. ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.").
39 Vattel expressed this principle by stating:
Nations ... are by nature equal and hold from nature the same obligations and
the same rights. Strength or weakness, in this case, counts for nothing. A dwarf
is as much a man as a giant is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign State than
the most powerful Kingdom.
From this equality it necessarily follows that what is lawful or unlawful for one
Nation is equally lawful or unlawful for every other Nation.
VATTEL, supra note 31, at 7.
618
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Examples of CIL include the principle of freedom of the sea.4 0
A related principle was the rule of CIL (during most of the
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century)
permitting states to claim jurisdiction up to three miles into the
territorial sea adjacent to its coast.4 1  Another long-standing
principle is that states must protect foreign ambassadors.42
Violations of CIL include piracy4 3 and the use of torture by a
State.44 Some customary rules are so strong that States may not
contract out of them by treaty.45  For example, it is widely
accepted that genocide is a violation of CIL and that States may
not opt out of this rule.46
Even with the proliferation of multilateral treaties, CIL
40 BARRY E. CARTER, PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 836 (4th ed. 2003).
Until the twentieth century, almost all of the law of the sea consisted of
customary law that was premised on freedom of the sea. The Justinian Code of
529 A.D., for instance, extended its authority only to the high-water mark and
not into the oceans. While several nations, especially Spain and Portugal,
purported to control all the world's oceans, these claims were not only short-
lived but impossible to enforce. Perhaps the most famous commentary on
freedom of the seas is Hugo Grotius's Mare Liberum, first published in 1609.
Grotius argued that no nation could legitimately exercise sovereignty over any
of the world's oceans, and he generally repudiated the notion of a mare clausem
(closed sea) as an illegitimate extension of sovereignty.
Id.
41 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1158-59.
42 Id. at 1151.
43 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004). Pirates sail under no
flag and engage in robbery and other violence against other ships. See United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 162 (1820).
44 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980). The issue of
torture exposes one of the inconsistencies of CIL. Many observers regard torture as a
violation of CIL, but they also acknowledge that many nations engage in torture.
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 24. If many states engage in torture, then how
can it be asserted that the ban on torture reflects the widespread and uniform practice of
states? See id. This reveals a deeper question whether CIL is or should be aspirational as
well as descriptive.
45 BEDERMAN, supra note 33, at 23.
46 Id. ("[T]wo States may not conclude a treaty reciprocally granting themselves
the right to commit genocide against a selected group.") Such universal norms are
referred to as jus cogens norms. "Jus cogens is a norm thought to be so fundamental that
it even invalidates rules drawn from treaty or custom." JANIS, supra note 13, at 65. Jus
cogens may be viewed as a modem form of natural law. Id.
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
remains vital to international relations because it occupies the
wide gaps not governed by treaties. To this extent, CIL is like the
tableau upon which the incomplete mosaic of multilateral treaties
is laid, with the treaties serving the purpose of altering the tableau,
clarifying it, or supplementing it. CIL may also at times provide a
quicker means to address new issues (notwithstanding the fact that
custom usually requires a lengthy amount of time to develop). A
good example is the development of CIL with regard to national
airspace in response to the invention of the airplane.4 7 Moreover,
CIL presents the possibility (remote or not) of imposing jus cogens
or peremptory norms, even in circumstances when States seek to
avoid such restrictions. After all, a treaty binds only those States
that have acceded to it. 8 CIL, at least in theory, is universally
binding.49 Given the continuing importance of CIL, it remains
important to explain how it is formed.
III. The Use of Contract to Explain CIL and Its
Fundamental Problems
A widely accepted view of State obligation is that no State is
bound by any international obligation except for those obligations
that it has voluntarily agreed to through practice (CIL) or in
treaties.so One leading commentator describes the international
47 See BEDERMAN, supra note 33, at 113-18.
48 See JANIS, supra note 13, at 21, 27-28.
49 Id. at 45.
50 LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS, at
XXIV (5th ed. 2009). The "positivist" approach to international law takes the position
that nothing can be law unless states have consented. STEINER, VAGTS & KoH, supra
note 30, at 241. The positivist approach views international law as the result of the
practice of states as evidenced by customs or treaties (what states actually do), as
opposed to the natural law approach, which is "the derivation of norms from basic
metaphysical principles" such as divine authority or universal reason. See DAMROSCH ET
AL., supra at xxiii.
Along the same lines, O'Connell writes: "The positive act of consent by states has been
used as both the defining characteristic of treaties and custom and of international law as
law." MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 134
(2008). The positivist view of CIL was the foundation of the decision in The Lotus Case.
That case arose out of the collision on the high seas between a French ship and a Turkish
ship. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 14. When the French ship arrived in Constantinople,
Turkish police arrested the first officer of the French ship (who was a French citizen) and
prosecuted him for his role in the collision. Id TT 15-17. France objected to this
treatment of its citizen and argued the matter before the Permanent Court of International
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political system as a product of "international 'social contract.""'
Professor Kelsen phrased this line of thinking as follows:
There is, however, another theory, mentioned before, according
to which customary international law is valid because it is based
on the recognition and thus on the consent of the states which
are bound by its norms. Hence, there is according to this
doctrine no essential difference between customary international
law and conventional international law, i.e., law established by
treaties, as far as their basis, the reason of validity, is concerned.
A treaty is binding upon the contracting parties because both of
them have consented to the norm created by their agreement.
The basis of the treaty, that is, the reason of validity of the
conventional norm, is the common consent of the contracting
parties. But why is the common consent, and only the consent,
Justice. Id. 1 187. It argued that Turkey had no right to exercise jurisdiction over its
citizen regarding a matter that occurred while he was on a French ship on high seas
outside of the territorial jurisdiction of Turkey. Id. TT 9, 57. France argued that Turkey
had the burden of showing the existence of a rule under international law granting it the
right to exercise jurisdiction over its citizen. Id. The Court rejected this argument, and
upheld Turkey's argument that it was permitted to exercise jurisdiction because its
exercise of jurisdiction did not conflict with any principle of international law. Id. 87.
In other words, because Turkey had never agreed to any such restriction on its
jurisdiction, there was no such restriction. The court observed:
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates
to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some
permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable if
international law contained a general prohibition to States to extend the
application of their laws and jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and
acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general prohibition, it
allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the
case under international law as it stands at present. Far from laying down a
general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend the application of
their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts
outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion
which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other
cases, every State remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best
and most suitable . . . . In these circumstances, all that can be required of a
State is that it should not overstep the limits which international law places
upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in
its sovereignty.
S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. 46-47. The issue, or problem, with a strong positivist view
is whether it leaves any room for jus cogens norms, which exist independently of state
consent.
51 Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8-11 (1995).
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binding upon the contracting states? The fundamental principle
which is at the basis of this theory is the principle of individual
liberty, which in the relation between states is called
sovereignty. It is the principle usually presented as a rule of
natural law, according to which an individual can be bound only
by his own will, for the individual is by his very nature free.
Hence it is impossible to obligate an individual against his own
will. When the individual lives together with other individuals,
and when it is necessary to regulate the mutual behavior of the
individuals, the only way in which a social order can be
established is a contract concluded between the free individuals.
They are bound by this contract, for this contract is based on
their common consent.52
Thus, the conventional view explicitly equates CIL with contract.
Other commentators echo this view.s"
52 KELSEN, supra note 1, at 314-15.
53 See, e.g., G.I. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (William E. Butler
trans., 1974) (1970) ("[A] customary norm of international law is the result of
agreement, that is, of the concordance of the wills of states"). Another commentator
stated:
Let us begin with our consideration of the concept of custom by elucidating its
essence. In the absence of supranational authority, the consent of independent
subjects lies at the root of every international legal norm. It is the only means
of creating norms. That is the only way to set the content of the norm and vest
it with legal force. Consent has two modes of expression. One of them is in the
clearly expressed, generally written, shape of a treaty. The other entails the
unwritten form of custom which in the majority of cases is generated not by
clearly expressed, but by tacit consent (tacitum pactum). Consequently, the
customary norm differs from the contractual not in essence, but in the method of
achieving agreement and the form of expressing the latter.
Lukashuk, supra note 33, at 488.
The views of Tunkin and Lukashuk of CIL seem to have been associated with Soviet
doctrine, which viewed the difference between treaties and customs as mere differences
in form. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (7th ed. 1997). Regardless of the ideological associations of
this view, the comparison of CIL to contract-type notions is widespread. This approach
to CIL has also been described as the "voluntarist" theory. "Proponents of this,
voluntarist, approach tend to equate the creation of custom with tacit agreement: just as
treaties are the written, formal expressions of States' will, so custom is its informal
manifestation." Rein Milllerson, Comm. on the Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int'l
Law, Int'l Law Ass'n, 3rd Interim Report of the Committee on the Formation of
Customary (General) International Law, 67 INT'L L. Ass'N REP. OF CONFS. 623, 628
(1996).
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These views represent a widely accepted school of thought.
Professor Henkin set forth an aspirational form of this view: "In
relations between nations, the progress of civilization may be seen
as movement from force to diplomacy, from diplomacy to law.
The hope of civilized men has long been that nations would cease
to pursue their interests by force, and attempt instead to negotiate
in quest of agreement." 5 4
Wrapped up in this embrace of a consent-based approach to
CIL are lofty (perhaps even wild-eyed) notions of what consent
may achieve. Some commentators apparently view a consent-
based approach as the vehicle to "solving the evils rampant in the
world-war, hunger, poverty, and violence."5 5  Phrased this way,
how could anyone object to the use of contract to explain CIL?
Nonetheless, my view is that the key word in Henkin's
observation is "hope."5 6 Many international law scholars appear
drawn to the use of contract to explain CIL because they wish that
the world were ordered by agreement rather than coercion or
force." Their views are grounded in an optimism that enlightened,
liberal reasoning will ineluctably lead to what they regard as good
and right." I contend, however, that Henkin's view is not
descriptive, but is merely aspirational. In other words, the use of
contract to explain CIL is due to wishful thinking and the hope
that one day contract (instead of something more realistic, like
status) will be the basis of public international law. Thus, even
54 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 1.
55 O'CONNELL, supra note 50, at 135.
56 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 1.
57 It is difficult to deny the allure of contracts to idealists. Contract and promise is
viewed as "an expression of the principle of liberty-the will binding itself, to use
Kantian language, rather than being bound by the norms of the collectivity. . . ."
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 19 (1981). Relationships based on something
other than Contract are described as tyranny.
For the sharing within a family is and must be voluntary. Where the sharing is
mandated by a higher authority it becomes despotism. A despotism may be
benign, even necessary, as where parents enforce a regime of forbearance
between their young children. But such parental enforcement becomes
gradually less tolerable as children grow older. Enforced against late
adolescents or adults it is pure tyranny.
Id. at 90.
58 See id at 90-91.
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though a contract-based model of CIL is often presented as a
means to describe CIL, it is actually a normative model disguised
as a descriptive model.
Theories of international law, including the contract-based
approach, have long been criticized for a naYve, moralistic view of
the world.59 Nalvet6 may, by itself, explain why the contract-
based approach to CIL seems to be the default explanation.
Nonetheless, there may be other, perhaps more charitable, excuses
as well. The resort to contract-based theory may be a result of
historical happenstance: contract-based theorists may simply be
unable to extricate themselves from the bindings of historical roots
and origins. For over a century, and probably longer,
commentators have recognized that modem international law is
"largely a product of Western European Christian civilisation [sic]
during the [sixteenth] and [seventeenth] centuries."6 0 This was the
period covering the Age of Enlightenment and the emergence of
Lockean theories of social contract." Such theories of contract lie
at the heart and origins of international law, and it is
understandable that this framework would persist. Nonetheless,
just because the theory holds historical interest does not mean it
has continuing or practical applicability. It is as if contemporary
commentators try to force reality into the ill-fitting and ill-suited
mold of contract simply because it was au courant when
international law began taking on a life of its own. It is equally
plausible, if not more, that the contract-based approach to CIL is
an archaic artifact that has little present-day use. Status is, to
many people, a more primitive framework, but its disfavored use
may be due to the energy and exuberance of contract-based
theories as Western Europe moved forward from its status-based
societies. The sheer momentum of contract may have distracted
commentators from asking whether contract (which undoubtedly
has more force to explain municipal government) even fits the
59 See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Nash Equilibrium and International Law, 96
CORNELL L. REv. 869, 891-96 (2011). Embarrassment with such nalvet6 is perhaps the
reason why other theorists have turned to game theory in order to introduce a hard
element to explain international law. Id. at 870-82.
60 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 87 (Robert Jennings & Arthur
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996).
61 See DONOVAN, supra note 12, at 36.
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realities of international law and relations.
A. The Problem with Contract as the Framework to Explain
CIL
Contract-based ordering enshrines the fundamental concept
that parties enjoy freedom of contract. Parties are regarded as
atomistic units in possession of enlightened reason and the
freedom to exercise autonomy in pursuit of exchange relationships
that will enhance the welfare of both parties to a contract.62 The
concept of freedom of contract has an equally important corollary
that must be considered: the right of freedom of contract is
necessarily intertwined with the right of freedom from contract.
Parties are not bound unless they choose to be bound. 63  The
fundamental premise of contract is violated when terms are
imposed on a party.6 This notion exposes the irreparable flaw
with attempting to explain CIL through the language of contract:
Nations do not enjoy freedom from CIL.
CIL rules apply to and bind all States that do not object to each
rule as it develops, whether or not there is affirmative consent
(unlike treaties in which non-ratifying states are not bound even if
it is a general, multilateral treaty). 65 The concept of consent is a
pure fiction, especially when seen in the application of CIL to new
states and the emergence of new rules of CIL.66 Hart noted with
regard to the fiction of consent:
It has never been doubted that when a new, independent state
emerges into existence, as did Iraq in 1932, and Israel in 1948, it
is bound by the general obligations of international law
including, among others, the rules that give binding force to
treaties. Here the attempt to rest the new state's international
62 See Scott & Stephan, supra note 11, at 63-64 (stating that a contract can serve as
mechanism to facilitate the achievement of a welfare objective).
63 Cf ATIYAH, supra note 10, at 408 (infering that "the autonomy of the free choice
of private parties to make their own contracts encompasses the freedom to refrain from
entering a contract).
64 See id. (stating that the court's role in adjusting rights was "inconsistent" with
contract theory).
65 DUNOFF, RATNER& WIPPMAN, supra note 35, at 86.
66 MALANCZUK, supra note 53, at 47.
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obligations on a 'tacit' or 'inferred' consent seems wholly
threadbare. The second case is that of a state acquiring territory
or undergoing some other change, which brings with it, for the
first time, the incidence of obligations under rules which
previously it had no opportunity either to observe or break, and
to which it had no occasion to give or withhold consent. If a
state, previously without access to the sea, acquires maritime
territory, it is clear that this is enough to make it subject to all
the rules of international law relating to the territorial waters and
the high seas.... [T]hese two important exceptions are enough
to justify the suspicion that the general theory that all
international obligation is self-imposed has been inspired by too
much abstract dogma and too little respect for the facts.67
This observation has been echoed by others: "[CIL's]
contractual device, tacit consent, is an obvious fiction that has
little explanatory power."68 It is not surprising that several
commentators have noted the obvious fiction of consent in CIL.
What is surprising is the persistent resort to this fiction to explain
CIL.
The fiction is further exposed by examining how CIL is
imposed on States. If the analogy to contract were to have any
67 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 226 (2d ed. 1994); see also MICHAEL
BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES 145 (1999).
68 Kelly, supra note 3, at 510. Kelly goes further by arguing: "CIL lacks authority
as law, because such norms are not, in fact, based on the implied consent or general
acceptance of the international community that a norm is obligatory. Both implied
consent and general acceptance are fictions used at different historical periods to justify
the universalization of preferred norms." Id. at 452. There are additional problems with
attempting to analogize CIL to contract:
Comparing the voluntary commitments made between states to contractual
commitments made between firms may seem inapt to the extent that state actors
are less faithful agents than corporate managers. For example, a critic might
well argue that the claim that governing elites create international law in order
to maximize the welfare of their citizens is far more problematic than the
parallel claim that managers of firms seek to maximize shareholder welfare.
After all, there are many more conflicts of interest between a dictator and his
subjects than there are between a manager and shareholders. To put the point
squarely: If a ruthless leader is maximizing his own gain at the expense of the
interests of his subjects and he is dealing with a representative democracy, why
should we be confident that any agreement that emerges between such different
states will be welfare-enhancing for the people of both those countries?
SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 11, at 56.
[Vol. XXXVII626
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW BY STATUS
force, the formation of CIL would be the result of bargains made
by equally autonomous and contractually active parties. This is
not how CIL develops.69 Only a few nations participate in the
development of CIL, and (not surprisingly) those few nations are
militarily and politically powerful nations:"o
Although all States are equally entitled to participate in the
customary process, in general, it may be easier for more
'powerful' States to behave in ways which will significantly
influence the development, maintenance or change of customary
rules.
... Among other things, powerful States generally have large,
well-financed diplomatic corps which are able to follow
international developments globally across a wide spectrum of
issues. This enables those States to object, in a timely fashion,
to developments which they perceive as being contrary to their
interests. If more than oral or written objection is required,
powerful States also have greater military, economic and
political strength which enables them to enforce jurisdictional
claims, impose trade sanctions and dampen or divert
international criticism. 71
69 See Oscar Schachter, New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice,
in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF KRSYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSK, supra note 33, at 536 ("International law doctrine
on customary law tends to obscure the problems by its emphasis on the consent of all
States, whether explicitly or by implication, and by its postulate of formal equality of
States.").
70 See Kelly, supra note 3, at 453 ("Few nations participate in the formation of
norms said to be customary. The less powerful nations and voices are ignored.").
71 BYERS, supra note 67, at 37. A more realistic description of the way in which
CIL is formed is probably as follows:
When one examines the emergence of such universally applicable customary
rules and principles as those relating to diplomatic immunities, the prohibition
of piracy and privateering, and sovereign rights over the continental shelf, it is
impossible to show that every State positively consented to the emergence of
the rule in question. Yet it is virtually unanimously accepted by the authorities
that these rules have come to bind all States.
The nature of the process by which these customary rules emerged seems to be
more along the following lines. Some States actively created the practice, some
by initiating it, some by imitating it, and others still, who were directly affected
by the claims in question, by acquiescing in it. This initiation, imitation and
acquiescence may plausibly be described in terms of consent. But others still,
who were not directly affected, sat by and did nothing, and in due course found
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The way in which CIL is actually developed bears little
resemblance to contractual notions of the exercise of autonomy
and consent and looks more like an imposition of terms on the
weak by the powerful.
Even the name, Customary International Law, conflicts with
the language of contract.72 The development of custom is, in large
part, the antithesis of the formation of contract:
A custom is not declared or enacted, but grows or develops
through time. The date when it first came into full effect can
usually be assigned only within broad limits. Though we may
be able to describe in general the class of persons among whom
the custom has come to prevail as a standard of conduct, it has
no definite author; there is no person or defined human agency
we can praise or blame for its being good or bad.73
In contrast, modem contract law is based upon "the
convergence of the wills of the contracting parties."74 It is about
two parties deciding what is best for their respective interests, with
or without reference to the world around them.7 ' The contract is
formed at a particular moment in time, and constitutes the parties'
declaration of what is best, under the circumstances, for them.76
Unlike the formation of contract, which is an exaltation of the will
of two individuals, the development of custom is a cultural
themselves bound by the emerging rule.
Muillerson, supra note 53, at 630.
72 One commentator described "custom" in the following way:
In any primitive society certain rules of behaviour emerge and prescribe what is
permitted and what is not. Such rules develop almost subconsciously within the
group and are maintained by the members of the group by social pressures and
with the aid of various other more tangible implements. They are not, at least in
the early stages, written down or codified, and survive ultimately because of
what can be called an aura of historical legitimacy.
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (5th ed. 2003).
73 LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 40 (1968).
74 MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
160 (1977).
75 See ATTYAH, supra note 10, at 408.
76 See id. at 417-19.
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phenomenon that subsumes the interests of individuals.7 Custom
and contract are fundamentally different concepts.
Such problems have fueled doubts regarding the usefulness of
contract to explain CIL. Some have directly challenged the
usefulness of a contract-based approach to explaining CIL. One
particularly critical commentator wrote:
It follows also that there is no merit in that trend in international
legal theory which supposes that States, as the subjects of
customary international law, consent to its formation as if by
some specific act of will, as if their participation were a
voluntary act. The abusive use of the ideas of the 'natural
liberty' of States, and hence the need for their 'consent' to any
abridgement of that liberty, are a cynical misappropriation of
some part of the ethos of revolutionary democracy. For the
controllers of the public realms of old- and new-regime States, it
was good to learn from Vattel . . . that the States were all 'free,
independent, and equal', fortunate inhabitants of a Lockian
'state of nature', so that the making, judging, and enforcement
of the law was entirely in their hands. It might have been
thought that such a voluntary theory of international law had
reached its pitiful nadir in the decision of the Permanent Court
of International Justice in the so-called Lotus Case (1927). But
the intellectual decline has continued, reaching new low-points
in such ideas as: (1) the idea that the formation of new rules of
customary international law requires some actual assenting state
of mind on the part of States, as if governments, let alone States,
had determinable states of mind; ....
This view reflects the uneasiness with the conventional
approach to CIL as something akin to contract. The question
remains, however, if contract does not explain CIL, then what
does?
Goldsmith and Posner have made a strong case that the
behavior of nations and the formulation of CIL can be explained
77 See MALANCZUK, supra note 53, at 35-39.
78 Philip Allott, The Concept of International Law, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 77 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
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by what they described as "rational choice" theory, which has its
roots in game theory.7 9 In criticizing the traditional view of CIL,
they wrote:
A [S]tate's compliance with the cooperative strategy in the
bilateral prisoner's dilemma has nothing to do with acting from
a sense of legal obligation. States do not act in accordance with
a rule that they feel obliged to follow; they act because it is in
their interest to do so. The rule does not cause the [S]tates'
behavior; it reflects their behavior. As a result, behavior in
bilateral iterated prisoner's dilemmas will change with
variations in the underlying payoffs. Cooperation will rise or
fall with changes in technology and environment. Although
most international law scholars acknowledge that [S]tates are
more likely to violate customary international law as the costs of
compliance increase, they insist that the sense of legal obligation
puts some drag on such deviations. Our theory, by contrast,
insists that the payoffs from cooperation or deviation are the sole
determinants of whether [S]tates engage in the cooperative
behaviors that are labeled customary international law.80
Their approach is not hobbled by reliance on assumptions
about equal, autonomous States, and the need for mutual
agreement. Consequently, rational choice theory offers a better
descriptive model than contract-based theory.
There has also been robust discussion of the state of CIL in the
post-Cold War era when the United States was considered to be
the undisputed superpower. Indeed, one school of thought is
based on the observation that "successive hegemonies have shaped
the foundations of the international legal system,"' -from
sixteenth century Spain, eighteenth century France, and nineteenth
century Britain, to the United States today.82 In light of this
situation, it is an open question whether CIL is simply the product
of the exercise of power by an all-powerful hegemon. In other
79 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 3, 7-14.
80 Id. at 39.
81 Michael Byers, Introduction to UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW I (Michael Byers & George Nolte eds., 2003).
82 See id.
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words, is it even useful to describe CIL as the product of
agreement or consent when one state is able to impose its will or
strongly influence the development of international law? I do not
attempt to answer this question, or even address whether the
United States is or is not able, or even if it desires, to impose CIL
at will. I refer to this ongoing discussion simply to expose a
further weakness in the view that CIL is based on consent.
Moreover, this is not a question unique to contemporary times.
The role of hegemonic power has been a recurring feature
underlying the development of CIL." The only question is
whether commentators have chosen to acknowledge this fact or
overlook it. If international law is determined by hegemony, then
there is little room for a contract-based view of CIL. More
importantly, for purposes of this paper, hegemony is a type of
status: Any explanation of CIL based on the asserted phenomenon
of hegemonic behavior is necessarily an explanation based on
status. Regardless of one's views, it is hard to deny that there are
fundamental problems with contract-based view and the consent-
based view as the explanation of CIL.84
83 See id. As Byers observed:
In the sixteenth century, Spain redefined basic concepts of justice and
universality so as to justify the conquest of indigenous Americans. In the
eighteenth century, France developed the modem concept of borders, and the
balance of power, to suit its principally continental strengths. In the nineteenth
century, Britain forged new rules on piracy, neutrality, and colonialism-again,
to suit its particular interests as the predominant power of the time.
Id.
84 At a minimum, more nuanced questions and factors that have nothing to do with
contract need to be considered. See Andrew Hurrell, Comments on Chapters Ten and
Eleven, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 81, at 352.
More specifically, we can quite easily identify a list of power resources
potentially relevant to the development of customary international law: (1)
Issue-specific power, for example in terms of military technology where the
United States has the clear capacity to shape how wars can be fought; (2) what
one might call the power of the critical moment and the capacity both to act and
to argue in a manner that can help crystallize or catalyze the emergence of a
new customary norm; . . . (3) institutional power, relevant because of the close
linkages that exist between custom and treaty and the ever increasing role of
institutional and multilateral forums in norm development; (4) the power to
shape the context or background against which customary norms emerge; ... or
the capacity of the United States to navigate successfully within transnational
civil society and to exploit the role of civil society in norm development to its
own advantages; and (5) the power over the complex processes of coercive
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
IV. Status as a Better Framework to Explain CIL
Status provides a better alternative than the contract-based
explanation of CIL because status does not resort to or rely on the
fiction of consent. If one accepts the proposition that some,
perhaps most, of CIL is an imposition of terms, or at least the
proposition that voluntary consent fails to explain CIL, then status
is a better model because status relationships do not depend on
consent. In status-based societies, parties do what they have to do,
not what they want to do. I contend that this simple statement
more accurately reflects our real world of approximately two
hundred nations of widely varying degrees of power and influence.
To develop this line of analysis, it is necessary to define status.
In its purest sense, status is a relationship or web of
relationships based on immutable characteristics." An example
would be blood ties within a family or tribe. Status is then further
refined through more particularized immutable characteristics,
such as age or gender, with such status commonly forming the
basis of and determining a person's legal and social positions
within a society." This explains why many ancient societies were
led by male elders. The inherent nature of status meant that status
could not be purchased. One cannot purchase age or a blood
relationship. In a status-based society, an individual's role is
determined by his or her set of immutable characteristics." One's
socialization by which weaker actors in the system come to accept and to
internalize norms originating elsewhere in the system. Coercive socialization
represents a political reality that has always threatened to destabilize or dilute
the formal concept of consent in international law.
Id.
85 See Jeanne Louise Carriere, From Status to Person in Book I, Title I of the Civil
Code, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1270 (1998) (quoting PLANIOL & RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE
CIVIL LAW 271, n.419 (La. St. L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959)) ("[Status refers] to
attributes 'inherent in the person,' over which 'private individuals have no power....
They cannot alter or dispose of such attributes by agreements, at their pleasure, as they
can do with their property."'). Similarly, a leading treatise states that status is used with
reference to "those comparatively few classes of persons in the community who, by
reason of their conspicuous differences from normal persons, and the fact that by no
decision of their own can they get rid of these differences, require separate consideration
in an account of the law." EDWARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 109 (P.B. Fairest
ed., 6th ed. 1967).
86 See Carriere, supra note 85, at 1270.
87 Cf id. at n.31 (discussing the formation of a person's identity in society).
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role is not based on what one wants, but is instead based on what
one must do. In such societies, the notion of living one's life in
the free pursuit of liberty and happiness is nonsensical. One must
do what one's status requires. The earliest forms of human
societies were based upon status because, like blood ties, they
originated from the family.
From a contemporary perspective, status is viewed as a
primitive and unenlightened form of social organization, and the
emergence of Western society out of a status-based society into
modem contract-based society was viewed as progress." In the
nineteenth century, Henry Maine observed that the transition from
primitive societies to modem societies was marked by a progress
from status to contract." Thus, status is equated with primitive
societies and contract is equated with modem societies.
This relationship between status and primitive societies makes
it even more baffling as to why contemporary scholars insist on
using contract-based theory to explain CIL because there seems to
be widespread agreement that public international law exists in a
primitive state.90 The reasons why international law is described
88 See MAINE, supra note 17, at 168-70.
89 Id.
90 The use of the word "primitive" is commonly used by influential commentators.
See, e.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 33, at 13 (writing that the "legal system remains
primitive and unformed," and, "[Plublic international law is not a mature legal system at
all-it remains strikingly primitive."); HENKIN, supra note 1, at 190 ("[Ilnternational law
remains primitive and develops slowly."). CIL is primitive because there is no central
governing authority with power to enforce the law. As Hart explained:
It is, of course, possible to imagine a society without a legislature, courts, or
officials of any kind. Indeed, there are many studies of primitive communities
which not only claim that this possibility is realized but depict in detail the life
of a society where the only means of social control is that general attitude of the
group towards its own standard modes of behaviour in terms of which we have
characterized rules of obligation. A social structure of this kind is often referred
to as one of 'custom'; ...
HART, supra note 67, at 91. He continued:
International law presents us with the converse case. For, though it is consistent
with the usage of the last 150 years to use the expression 'law' here, the absence
of an international legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and centrally
organized sanctions have inspired misgivings, at any rate in the breasts of legal
theorists. The absence of these institutions means that the rules for states
resemble that simple form of social structure, consisting only of primary rules
of obligation, which, when we find it among societies of individuals, we are
accustomed to contrast with a developed legal system.
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as primitive are familiar: (1) There is no global legislature,9 1 (2)
there is no executive authority to enforce international law,92 (3)
there is no judicial body with universal binding jurisdiction to
resolve disputes.9 3
Id. at 214.
91 MALANCZUK, supra note 53, at 3.
92 See id.
93 See id. ("The United Nations General Assembly is not a world legislature, the
International Court of Justice in The Hague can operate only on the basis of the consent
of states to its jurisdiction, and the law-enforcement capacity of the United Nations
Security Council is both legally and politically limited."). This sharp distinction between
domestic legal systems and international law raises the persistent question whether
international law is really law in the first place. See BEDERMAN, supra note 33, at 6-9.
Despite the absence of these features, many argue there is nonetheless a international
legal system. Gluckman rejected the notion that primitive societies had no law merely
because they lacked legal institutions. GLUCKMAN, supra note 19, at 182. He drew the
distinction by observing that such societies "have 'law' but lack 'legal institutions."' Id.
Thus, the absence of formal institutions does not necessarily mean there is no
international law. Hart added:
To argue that international law is not binding because of its lack of organized
sanctions is tacitly to accept the analysis of obligation contained in the theory
that law is essentially a matter of orders backed by threats.... Yet once we free
ourselves from the predictive analysis and its parent conception of law as
essentially an order backed by threats, there seems no good reason for limiting
the normative idea of obligation to rules supported by organized sanctions.
HART, supra note 67, at 217-18.
Nevertheless, there is also a contrary view. Without institutional enforcement
mechanisms, one might ask how international law is different from rules of etiquette.
Most people abide by such rules and accept that they are binding, but few would
characterize them as a legal system. Moreover, the force of such rules should not be
underestimated. For example, when is the last time someone at a dinner party in
America or Western Europe observed someone else dig his or her hands into a salad
serving bowl? There is no institutional sanction for this behavior, but people refrain
from it. Thus, how is international law different from such social norms of behavior?
Some would argue there is no difference. A more conventional view holds as follows:
Customary rules of law are to be distinguished from rules of etiquette, known as
comity. In the case of customary law, an established pattern of law (for
example, diplomatic immunity) is based on a sense of legal obligation (opinion
juris) and invites penalties if breached, whereas in the case of comity, it is
merely a matter of courtesy (for example, two ships saluting each other's flag
while passing at sea). Admittedly, when states engage in certain standard
practices toward each other, it is not always clear whether they do so out of a
sense of legal obligation or simply out of politeness.
J. MARTIN ROCHESTER, BETWEEN PERIL AND PROMISE, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 40 (2006).
This explanation seems a bit too facile though. Observance of social norms at a dinner
party may be called etiquette. Yet, there is the real possibility of punishment for a
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If it is correct that the public international law is a primitive
system, then why use the framework of contract-which explains
the structure of modem societies-to explain it? It seems more
sensible to utilize the analytical framework used to explain
primitive social systems to explain another primitive system.
Public international law has not yet evolved out of status to the
point where it makes sense to apply a contractual analysis.9 4
breach of etiquette-exclusion from future social events. So, is it simply a question of
manners or is the dinner guest observing a norm that has as much force and substance as
international law?
94 It appears there was an earlier attempt to explain international law on a status-
like approach:
In the nineteenth century, Savigny and his colleagues and followers wanted to
explain why, say, German law was (and should be) different from French law,
Italian law, and so on. What they said was that law-especially customary
law-represented the national spirit, the volksgeist of the particular people
concerned. Customary rules were not the result of a formal, law-making
process: they just emerged out of the juridical consciousness of the people.
This product of Romantic nationalism has long been discredited as a legal
theory; and it seems particularly inappropriate to public international law, where
no volk with common traditions and culture yet exists, and where customary
rules these days do not just grow up, but come into being through the deliberate
conduct of the principal actors for the most part.
Millerson, supra note 53, at 636.
Savigny's view seems to be a natural extension of classic natural law theory. A former
Chief Justice of the Supreme Federal Court of Germany described his view of natural
law in a series of lectures delivered in the early 1930s:
There is a law above the nations even when there is no supernational legislator,
a law indeed that is in the making and therefore uncertain, but nevertheless a
law, like the early law of most Teutonic nations that was a customary and
judge-made law applied a very long time before the customs and sentences were
collected by a private codificator or even converted into official statute law.
Customs and sentences and statutes are themselves like saplings or suckers,
sprouting out of a deep, common rootstock, the underlying primordial law of
human nature ruling all sorts and conditions of men living together, working
together, struggling and quarreling with each other, from the nomad family to
the League of Nations. .. . I will only ask where you find the standard to decide
whether an international treaty is a just and equitable one if there is no
international law but only treaty law? There must be a higher law behind the
treaty to judge it. And where do you take the primordial rule that international
treaties ought to be kept but from that higher law? Indeed it is a law without a
legislature and without an executor; such law has existed in all ages and with all
peoples, and it exists today in the most civilized countries, a law in being before
it is found out by the judge or the legislator and enforced by the bailiff. It is this
law that makes sovereign states responsible. Law in the last instance does not
derive its authority from the state, but from God who made mankind to strive
after the righteousness of his kingdom.
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Public international law should be viewed in its evolutionary
context, with recognition that it exists in primitive form, and must
be understood and explained with reference to its state of
development.95
WALTER SIMONs, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW IN EUROPE SINCE
GROTIUS 73-74 (William S. Hein & Co. Inc. ed., 2004) (1931).
My thesis differs materially from the Romantic Nationalist view in that my view of
status is based on status in the form of power differences between countries and not folk
consciousness or similar concepts. Moreover, the Romantic Nationalist view depends on
a conception of the state that (for the most part) does not reflect contemporary reality.
Its view of the state is based upon the following lines:
All our cultural States were formerly clan-States; and in the unity of blood, the
unity of descent, the unity of their view of life, lay their strength. . . . There is an
extraordinary communal nerve in this clan connection; and it is comprehensible
that all phenomena of life under these conditions are social in character; and
that all thought and action unite in the idea that each individual is a member of
the tribe whose famous ancestors are worshipped as divine, and that he
performs his great deed in the sight of his forefathers.
Josef Kohler, Evolution of the State, in EVOLUTION OF LAW, PRIMITIVE AND ANCIENT
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 88, 88 (Albert Kocourek & John H. Wigmore eds., 1915). The
United States is obviously not a clan-state, and even the nations of Europe, which at one
time resembled clan-states, no longer fit that description in the 21st century. Thus, any
theories of international law based upon notions of the clan-state have no relevance
today.
95 Notwithstanding their contract-based view of CIL, Scott and Stephan implicitly
acknowledged a status-based view when they wrote: "Under some accounts, an 'invisible
college' of international law specialists determines both who belongs to the rulemaking
group and uses general normative principles such as human dignity, good faith, and
fairness to decide what counts as a binding norm." SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 11, at
33. This "invisible college" is like the tribal elders of pre-modern, status-based societies.
This reliance on the "invisible college" or tribal elders was the foundation of the ruling
in what is probably the most famous American case involving CIL, The Paquette
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). The lasting influence of this case is due to the Court's
now famous statement that: "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." Id. at
700. The court answered if there was a rule of CIL that exempted coastal fishermen
from seizure by an enemy navy during wartime. See id. at 686. The Court found there
was such a rule, but the manner in which the court determined the rule's existence is
noteworthy. The Court stated:
For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.
Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their
authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of
what the law really is.
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As with individuals, nations may be described in terms of
status. Absent hostile conquests or secessions, nations possess
immutable characteristics. For example, Japan is an island nation.
Switzerland is marked by its mountainous topography. Such
features are immutable, and the cultures of these countries have
been shaped and defined by their physical features. Immutability
can also be seen in less tangible features. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and
the Vatican are defined by their religious identities. Status is also
determined by and reflected in the relationship between countries.
Great Britain's status is, to a large extent, the result of two
immutable facts: (1) It is a geographical part of Europe, but
physically separated from the continent, and (2) it was the colonial
founder of what became the United States. Canada's status is
related to the immutable fact that it shares a long border with the
United States and lives in the political shadow of its more
Id. at 700 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895)).
Wheaton places, among the principal sources of international law: "Text-writers
of authority, showing what is the approved usage of nations, or the general
opinion respecting their mutual conduct, with the definitions and modifications
introduced by general consent." As to these he forcibly observes: "Without
wishing to exaggerate the importance of these writers, or to substitute, in any
case, their authority for the principles of reason, it may be affirmed that they are
generally impartial in their judgment. They are witnesses of the sentiments and
usages of civilized nations, and the weight of their testimony increases every
time that their authority is invoked by statesmen, and every year that passes
without the rules laid down in their works being impugned by the avowal of
contrary principles."
Id at 700-01 (quoting HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 15
(Richard Henry Dana ed., 8th ed. 1866)).
Chancellor Kent says: "In the absence of higher and more authoritative
sanctions, the ordinances of foreign States, the opinions of eminent statesmen,
and the writings of distinguished jurists, are regarded as of great consideration
on questions not settled by conventional law. In cases where the principal
jurists agree, the presumption will be very great in favor of the solidity of their
maxims; and no civilized nation, that does not arrogantly set all ordinary law
and justice at defiance, will venture to disregard the uniform sense of the
established writers on international law."
The Paquette Habana, supra, at 701 (quoting JAMES KENT, KENT'S COMMENTARY ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (J.T. Abdy ed., 2d ed. 1878)). With no irreverence intended, I
ask how are these distinguished commentators any different from tribal elders in a pre-
industrial village. Moreover, who are they? What are their qualifications? Who decided
they, and not someone else, would ascend to their elite status? Is there any democratic
legitimacy to their status? In sum, how is the reliance on such persons any different
from the hierarchy of status-based societies? These questions become more pointed
when considered in the context of the ethnocentric roots of international law.
6372012]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
powerful neighbor. Even characteristics that are not necessarily
fixed can become relatively fixed over long periods of time. One
example is military and economic power. Military and economic
powers are not immutable, but they may persist for decades. The
United States is the lone superpower for now, and this confers
upon it a unique status.
The importance of immutable characteristics is seen in the fact
that they have determined the outcome of international legal
disputes. The Fisheries Case,96 a legal dispute between the United
Kingdom and Norway before the International Court of Justice,
illustrates this principle." That case involved Norway's
delimitation of its exclusive fisheries zone along its coast." The
dispute arose due to incidents in which Norway seized British
fishing boats.99 Norway asserted the boats had unlawfully entered
its exclusive fisheries zone (in essence, its territorial sea over
which it held exclusive jurisdiction).'o The United Kingdom
objected, and argued that Norway's assertion was based upon the
use of improper baselines to draw the boundaries of the zone."o0
Both parties agreed that a nation's territorial sea extended four
miles from its coastline.'0 2 The United Kingdom argued that
international law required the four mile limit to be determined by a
baseline drawn from the low water mark on permanently dry land
on Norwegian territory or the proper closing line of Norway's
internal waters. 0 3
The court narrowed the issue to whether the relevant low water
mark was from the mainland or from what Norway called the
96 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18) (addressing the
application of CIL standards to immutable characteristics of Norway's coast).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 125.
99 Id. at 124-25.
100 Id.
101 See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 120.
102 See id. at 120, 126. However, this fact should not be interpreted as an
affirmation of the role of agreement or consent in CIL. In fact, many nations at that time
asserted different distances of jurisdiction for their coastal waters. See GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra note 2, at 59-60. Many nations asserted three, six, or more miles. See id.
103 Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 120.
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skjaergaard.'0 4 The court ruled in favor of Norway and its use of
the baseline drawn from the skjaergaard.os The court observed
that Norway's method was "imposed by the peculiar geography of
the Norwegian coast."' 6 It noted: "The coast of the mainland does
not constitute, as it does in practically all other countries, a clear
dividing line between land and sea. What matters, what really
constitutes the Norwegian coast line, is the outer line of the
skjaergaard."'0 o
This case demonstrates the viability of a status-based analysis
of CIL. A status-based analysis of this case certainly fits better
than a contract-based analysis. The outcome was not based upon
notions of agreement or consent. The outcome was the result of
Norway's immutable characteristics: the geographical nature of its
coastline.
Status also provides a better explanation for CIL because the
over two hundred nations in existence do not have freedom from
each other. Freedom of contract is an empty right if there is no
freedom not to contract. Using the language of contracts to
explain CIL is misplaced because nations do not have freedom
from each other in the development of CIL. Nations are not like
free market participants that have the freedom to contract or not to
contract with other participants. Nations are more akin to two
hundred tribal members who live in a remote village surrounded
by inhospitable mountains. Whether they like it or not, the two
hundred villagers must interact with each other, and they do not
have the ability to escape interaction. In this global village, to
borrow an overused phrase, roles are determined by status, and
custom is influenced by the strong and powerful, not the weak.'
Like nations, the villagers did not will themselves or consent to
104 See id. at 128. The skjaergaard includes all the islands, islets, rocks and reefs
off Norway's coast. Id. at 127.
105 Id. at 139.
106 Id
107 Id. at 127.
108 This is especially true if one subscribes to the view that international law is
determined by the wishes of an all-powerful hegemon. This is one reason why nations
are unable to live in isolation and withdraw from interaction with others. Myanmar is
one example of a nation's inability to live in isolation. No matter what it does, it is
unable to free itself from interaction with and criticism from the United States.
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their existence in the village. That is where they found
themselves, and there is nothing they can do about the situation.109
At its core, the contract-based approach is a form of rejection
of the natural law theory of international law because there is little
room for autonomy and consent if law is imposed from above.'
To the extent that the development of international law has been a
movement away from natural law, there has been an equal
reluctance to consider status due to its perceived association with
natural law. Nonetheless, status, as the antithesis of contract, is
not necessarily based on natural law. Status, at least as it relates to
nations, is about how nations actually interact with each other. To
that extent, status may be viewed as a form of positivism.
Nevertheless, the conventional thinking seems unable to
accommodate this view. For example, one commentator observed:
"International law, according to positivists, is decentralized,
reciprocal and consensual. Naturalists imagine it to be
hierarchical, centralized and coercive whereas, according to
positivists, international law possesses none of these
qualities . . . ."'" Thus, according to this view, a positivist model
has no room for coercion, and coercion features only in natural
109 The parallels between international relations among states and pre-modern tribal
society were noted by Professor Vinogradoff of Oxford in the early 20th century.
A most important function of the tribal federation is the administration of law.
Within the tribe, its constituent members, the clans, enjoy full autonomy, but in
relation to outsiders-especially in the organization of defence-the tribe is a
compact and undivided whole. In order to preserve this organic solidarity,
careful provision must be made that the composite character of the aggregate
does not lead to any irreconcilable conflicts. Thus the management of ordinary
law in tribal society falls into two distinct departments. Within the clan,
government is based on patriarchal authority, which in its turn recognized the
sway of religious and moral sanctions-those primary notions of right and
justice which were termed by the Romans asfas and ius. As between clans, the
regulating forces are directed by principles which nowadays would be described
as rules of positive international law.
PAUL VINOGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 345 (1920).
110 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, in THE NATURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 355, 356 (Gerry Simpson ed., 2001) ("From the simple denial of
the existence of principles of natural justice . . . follow the three liberal principles of
social organization: freedom, equality and the Rule of Law.").
III Gerry Simpson, Introduction to THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra
note 110, at xxii.
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law.112
These conclusions are artificial and inaccurate constraints on
the understanding of CIL. Status may be hierarchical and
coercive, but it does not necessarily reflect the natural order of
things. For example, status based on military power is not
determined by a higher authority. The explanations of CIL are rife
with false choices that have no basis in actual conditions. Such
choices hamper the development of a coherent theory and distract
from the possibility of status as an organizing principle. Status
may be viewed by some as something that was left behind in
history, at least as it is in the West. On the contrary, status
possesses as much contemporary force as positivism and is not
based on outdated notions seen in natural law.
A. A Response to Maine's Critics
Because the foundational premise of this paper is based on
Maine's observation that history has been marked by societies'
progressions from status to contract, it is necessary to address
criticisms of this view. One criticism is that the observation is too
general and sweeping, that all societies embody a blend of status
and contract."' Another criticism is that contract has preceded
status in some societies.114
112 Id.
113 See NORBERT ROULAND, LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 229 (Philippe G. Planel trans.,
1994) (1988).
114 See id at 228-29. One commentator summarized the criticism:
Criticism of Maine's theory began in 1950 when it was called into question by
the anthropologist Robert Redfield. Redfield took Maine to task for his reliance
on Greek, Roman and Indian sources, and for having believed, following
evolutionist thinking, that this data could be directly extrapolated to traditional
societies which could still be observed. In 1964 Hoebel pursued this analysis.
In common with Durkheim, he believed that status and contract were not
mutually exclusive, but existed in different degrees.
In 1981 Leopold Pospisil went further in arguing, principally, that the classic
evolutionist model should be stood on its head: contract could precede status.
Pospisil used the Kapauku (New Guinea) as an example. In the pre-colonial era
Kapauku society was characterized by the high degree of inititative and
personal liberty accorded to its members. Colonization witnessed the
transformation of this society towards the status model; a central power was put
in place, which restricted individual liberty.
What, in conclusion, do we make of Maine's ideas and the subsequent criticism
of them? In our view, three points emerge. On the one hand, historical and
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The first criticism is really a straw man because I do not
believe Maine suggested that status and contract are mutually
exclusive. Bargained-for-exchange undoubtedly existed in pre-
modem times in status-based societies, whether those engaged in it
called it that or not. Exchange is an inescapable feature of human
interaction. The issue is which model predominates-a question
that even the critics concede."' Maine's observation may be
summarized as noting that societies have progressed from
predominately status-oriented societies to predominately contract-
oriented ones." 6
As for the argument that contract may precede status, that
argument misinterprets Maine's point. Maine's observation was
based on a historical, epochal perspective."' Over the course of
millennia, many societies have moved from status to contract."'
Critics' assertions that contract may precede status is based on
momentary events in the sweep of history."' They point to
discrete political events of a particular country when a government
based on contract-like ordering was succeeded by a government
based on status-like ordering in the form of elections or non-
democratic change.'2 0 Yes, it is true that Weimar Germany was a
predominately contract-based society where market exchange
governed social interaction. Indeed, it suffered from a
ethnographic observation demonstrates that it is impossible to find societies
which conform exclusively to either the status or contract model: Durkheim and
Hoefel were right in stressing that the two modes coexisted in all societies.
However, it is also the case that in general each society is characterized by the
dominance of one model over the other. This dominance, evolutionist thinking
to the contrary, is not chronologically determined. As Pospisil has stated, status
can follow contract. Our century offers many examples of such developments:
on a number of occasions totalitarian or authoritarian regimes have succeeded
democratic systems, determining the rights and duties of individuals principally
on the basis of class. Social organizations rather than historical inevitability
determines the primacy of contract or status.
Id.
115 See id.
116 See supra note 19-22 and accompanying text.
117 See MAINE, supra note 17, at 113-70.
118 Id.
119 See ROULAND, supra note 113, at 228-29.
120 Id. at 229.
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catastrophic excess of exchange-based relationships as reflected in
and caused by ruinous hyperinflation.121 And yes, it is true that the
Weimar Republic was followed by a new political structure based
on status where individuals and groups were singled out for
persecution by the government based on status and immutable
characteristics. 12 2
These facts do not undercut Maine's observation. This and
other similar examples are (hopefully) infrequent blips in history
resulting from fleeting political circumstances (as appalling as
they are). Such examples do not address or undercut the accuracy
of Maine's observation, which was based on a timeframe
measured in millennia, not months.
The reason why Maine is correct is because human society
originated from family and blood relationships.123  Parent-child
relationships were the result of immutable, biological relationships
(before modern reproductive technologies). Such relationships are
the quintessential forms of status.'2 4 Even Maine's critics are
forced to acknowledge this.125  Norbert Rouland advances the
criticism that status does not necessarily precede contract,'26 but he
then devotes more than thirty pages to discussions of blood
kinship relationships (with diagrams) and their essential role in
societal formation.127 Rouland also acknowledges that elementary
121 See George J.W. Goodman, The German Hype-Inflaction, 1932, COMMANDING
HEIGHTS, www.pbs.org/wgbh/commanding
heights/shared/minitext/ossgermanyhyperinflation/html (last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
122 See id.
123 MAINE, supra note 17, at 126. Maine wrote:
It is full, in all its provinces, of the clearest indications that society in primitive
times was not what it is assumed to be at present, a collection of individuals. In
fact, and in the view of the men who composed it, it was an aggregation of
families. The contrast may be most forcibly expressed by saying that the unit of
an ancient society was the Family, of a modem society the individual.
Id. (emphasis in original). The reference to family is relevant for international law
because of the time-worn references to the "family of nations." See, e.g., James B. Scott,
The Legal Nature of International Law, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 19, 38 (1965). If nations are a family, then why shouldn't their
relationships be viewed through the framework of status?
124 See MAINE, supra note 17, at 170.
125 See ROULAND, supra note 113, at 214.
126 See id. at 124.
127 See id. at 181-216.
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social structures rely "exclusively on kinship ties."' 28 This
confirms Maine's point: Human society springs from family
relationships (status) then expands to interaction with unrelated
people through exchange relationships (contract).129 What
preceded the first family and kinship forms of human social units?
The answer is obvious: nothing. 3 0 Thus, I contend that the core
aspect of Maine's observation remains valid, notwithstanding
modem attempts to discredit it.
B. Possible Reasons Why Status Is Not Used to Explain CIL
If status offers a better way to explain CIL, why has it been
overlooked or disregarded in favor of contract? A possible
explanation may be that status implies the use of force and
coercion. Status implies a relationship in which participants do
tasks because they have to, not because they want to. 131 Status-
based societies are based on obligation as the defining feature of
128 Id. at 165.
129 GLUCKMAN, supra note 19, at 48-49. Gluckman affirmed this point:
[Maine's observation] stresses that in the early law of Europe, as in the law of
tribal society, most of the transactions in which men and women are involved,
are not specific, single transactions involving the exchange of goods and
services between relative strangers. Instead, men and women hold land and
other property, and exchange goods and services, as members of a hierarchy of
political groups and as kinsfolk or affines. People are linked in transactions
with one another because of pre-existing relationships of status between them.
Id.
130 See VINOGRADOFF, supra note 109, at 163 (noting the earliest forms of human
society "are derived from some form of family organization"). Similarly, Gluckman
observed that the earliest forms of tribal organization began "with the small hunting-
band, all of whose members are related to one another by blood or marriage and who
accept the leadership of one or more of their senior members." See GLUCKMAN, Supra
note 19, at 83.
131 I question whether status is always and necessarily based on force or coercion.
Such a view would necessarily imply that an individual's wants are always (or at most
times) in conflict with wants of the group. One could imagine situations where that is
not the case or an instance when individuals are not even aware of the possibility of
individual choice or desire. Another reason why status has been overlooked may be the
fact that international law is a "predominantly 'Western' concept which was created
from the viewpoint of a dominant 'Western' culture and which does not sufficiently take
into account other cultural traditions . . . ." A.S. Muller, The Triple Helix of Culture,
International Law, and the Development of International Law, in CULTURE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 43, 50 (Paul Meerts ed., 2008). If what is called "international
law" were more influenced by East Asian culture, perhaps the notion of status as a
framework for CIL would not seem so foreign.
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interpersonal relationships, not choice.'32 Transactions occur
within the strict structure of hierarchy based on kinship or other
status relationships; those transactions only have meaning and
force within those status relationships.'33 Unlike in contemporary
Western society, individuals in status-based societies are not free
to order the world as they see fit, in a world where the only limits
are set by individual wants. Thus, this world of status conflicts
with everything that is dear to contemporary Western liberal
thought and aspiration.
The reluctance to consider status as the descriptive model of
CIL undoubtedly lies in the fact that it implies coercion. When
relationships are based on what one must do, the implication is
that there is some coercive force, usually a stronger party
imposing terms on a weaker party. Most theorists raised in a
liberal tradition are understandably squeamish about the notion
that they may live in a world where the powerful impose terms on
the weak.'3 4 Such theorists are likely to imagine that the world has
progressed far beyond the events of the Melian Dialogue as
recorded by Thucydides in The History of the Peloponnesian
War.'35 As recorded, the militarily superior Athenians presented
the inhabitants of the island of Melos (a weak military force) with
an ultimatum: submit to the rule of Athens or be destroyed."' The
Melians responded they had always maintained neutrality with
respect to Athens and its enemies, and those arguments were based
on reason in order to persuade the Athenians to abandon their
claims to Melos.' The Athenians made no attempt to disguise
132 See GLUCKMAN, supra note 19, at 48.
I33 See id at 49.
134 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 15. This would explain why there is
a proliferation of theories based on the premise that nations comply with international
law because it is morally right, which are often intertwined with the notion of consent.
Goldsmith and Posner are famous for their rejection of such theories. See id. at 14.
135 See id. at 167-69 (noting that the Athenians did not hide their intentions in the
Peloponnesian War through the use of moral rhetoric, which is a kind of openness that
has not been observed in many state actions since).
136 See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 268 (Richard Crawley
trans., 2004) (1910).
137 See id at 268-72.
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their intentions or motivations with pretextual justifications.'
Their demand is now part of classic lore: "Right, as the world
goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong
do what they can and the weak suffer what they must."" 9 To a
large extent, the development of modem international law has
been an attempt to create a world order that leaves no room for a
repeat of the encounter between the Athenians and the Melians.
This alone would explain why modem theorists eschew a status-
based theories of CIL.
One ignores the obvious, though, if one refuses to consider the
role of power in CIL. As stated by one commentator: "The
content of CIL seems to track the interests of powerful nations." 4 0
To put it bluntly, many norms of CIL may have been the result of
the exercise of pure power.'4 '
Most international legal scholars, however, have devoted
little energy to considering directly the effects of State
inequalities, or international relations-type power relationships,
on the processes of international law creation. Studies of
treaties, customary international law, general principles of law
and the 'subsidiary' sources of international law (i.e., judicial
decisions and scholarly writings) usually give short shrift to the
possibility that relative power differences among States might
affect the development, maintenance and change of rules. Many
international lawyers have assumed, to varying degrees, that
international law is the result of processes which are at least
procedurally objective and in that sense apolitical. It is possible
that this relative lack of interest in the role of power, and the
138 See id
139 Id. at 269. The Melians refused to submit to the Athenians and were
consequently conquered and destroyed. See id. at 272-73.
140 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1114 (emphasis in original).
141 See CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 154 (P.E. Corbett trans., 1968). For example, it is highly plausible that "some
particular powerful prince early asserted sovereign or diplomatic immunity, and his
lawyers provided conceptual underpinning for it." HENKrN, supra note 1, at 35. This
paper's use of the term "power" is borrowed from Professor Byers, who describes power
as "the ability, either directly or indirectly, to control or significantly influence how
actors - in this case States - behave." BYERS, supra note 67, at 5. Two common sources
of national power are military strength and wealth. See id
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associated assumption of procedural objectivity, are based, in
part, on an overly broad conception of sovereign equality.142
This notion of sovereign equality, however, is another obvious
fiction. Only a few countries over the course of history possessed
the power or influence to shape CIL.143
As a historical fact, the great body of customary international
law was made by remarkably few States. Only the States with
navies-perhaps 3 or 4 made most of the law of the sea.
Military power, exercised on land and sea, shaped the customary
law of war and, to a large degree, the customary rules on
territorial rights and principles of State responsibility. "Gunboat
diplomacy" was only the most obvious form of coercive law-
making.144
According to one prominent naval historian, since the time of
the Romans, the dominant nation in world affairs has been
whichever nation commanded naval superiority. 145  A prime
example of the role of naval power was President Harry Truman's
1945 proclamation extending U.S. control over its seabed
resources from twelve nautical miles to the edge of the continental
shelf.146
142 BYERS, supra note 67, at 35.
143 See Schachter, supra note 69, at 531.
144 Id. Other commentators have expressed similar views:
But it is inescapable that some states are more influential and powerful than
others and that their activities should be regarded as of greater significance.
This is reflected in international law so that custom may be created by a few
states, provided those states are intimately connected with the issue at hand,
whether because of their wealth and power or because of their special
relationship with the subject-matter of the practice, as for example maritime
nations and sea law. Law cannot be divorced from politics or power and this is
one instance of that proposition.
SHAW, supra note 72, at 75. Not all commentators share this view. D'Amato wrote:
"Custom is a very 'democratic' modality of law-formation; it gives all states a chance to
participate in the practice that constitutes custom. In this sense custom is a perfect
reflection of the decentralized international legal system." D'AMATO, supra note 4, at
28.
145 See BERNARD SEMMEL, LIBERALISM AND NAVAL STRATEGY 3 (1986).
146 See BYERS, supra note 67, at 90-91.
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At the time it was made, this claim was inconsistent with pre-
existing international law. No State had ever made a general
claim to control over all of the seabed resources of its
continental shelf beyond twelve nautical miles, nor had anything
approaching such a claim appeared in any treaty. Yet
notwithstanding the initial inconsistency between the [U.S.]'s
claim and pre-existing international law, the claim rapidly
acquired the status of customary international law as other States
followed the lead of the United States and made similar claims
to jurisdiction over their own continental shelves . . . . Why was
the Truman Proclamation so successful in promoting the
development of a rule of customary international law? One
important factor was undoubtedly the position of the United
States. In 1945 the United States was by far the world's most
powerful State, having emerged victorious and relatively
unscathed from the Second World War.14 7
Another example of naval power establishing CIL involves the
now unquestioned right to freedom of the seas. It may seem odd
to think of a regime where the right to sail the seas is controlled by
one country; on the contrary, there was a time when a few
countries, such as Spain, claimed control over the ocean. 148
147 Id. at 91-92. Naval power is unique among other forms of military power in its
ability to shape CIL. See D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 3-4
(1975).
Navies alone afford governments the means of exerting pressure more vigorous
than diplomacy and less dangerous and unpredictable in its results than other
forms of force, because the freedom of the seas makes them locally available
while leaving them uncommitted. They have the right to sail the seas and the
endurance to do so for requisite periods, while land-based forces cannot present
a credible level of coercion without overstepping the boundaries of national
sovereignty.
Id.
The sea, then, is the only area where armed forces can joust with more or less
seriousness in order to promote political objectives; the only area where they
can be concentrated, ready for intervention but not overtly threatening to
intervene. An army that crosses a frontier represents a use of force altogether
different from a navy that crosses the seas.
Id at 8.
148 JOHN W. COOGAN, THE END OF NEUTRALITY, THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND
MARITIME RIGHTS 1899-1915, at 17 (1981).
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Spain's abandonment of its claim was not the result of an exercise
of free will through bargaining among interested and autonomous
parties.149  England and Holland imposed on Spain the CIL
principle of freedom of the seas when their "cannon[s] shattered
Spain's claim to oceanic sovereignty."5 0
Given the relationship between power and status, a reader
might ask whether there is any difference between the two. In
other words, what does the discussion of status add that is not
explained by power alone? Although the two are intertwined,
power is not, and cannot be, the sole explanation of CIL.
Civilized society must be ordered on some basis, and power alone
does not provide a sufficient foundation for civilized ordering.
Power alone is simply just another name for the state of nature-
the law of the jungle, where the strong prey upon the weak as the
mood strikes. Status has and does provide a basis for civilized
ordering. Although status may not be the foundation in Western
countries today, it was in the past and still is in other parts of the
world today. Some may argue that status is not an ideal or
preferred way to order society, but that is not the issue. There is
order, whether it is the type of order one prefers or not, and that
distinguishes status from power alone.
Moreover, the favoring of contract as the model to explain CIL
because it is based on free will and consent, and not coercion,
needs re-examination. The embrace by contemporary theorists of
contract may be explained by two general observations. First, the
favoring of contract is a rejection of natural law theory. After all,
natural law is something imposed by or descended from a higher
authority."' Contract exalts individual autonomy and will over
higher authority.152 Thus, contract-based theories of CIL are
positivist in nature because they are based on what nations do
upon the exercise of autonomy and sovereignty.'5 3 Second,
'49 Id.
150 See id. Another example of military power in the role of CIL formation is seen
in the development of the CIL rule regarding coastal waters. In the early seventeenth
century, the range of onshore cannons became the determining factor to establish the
extent of coastal control of natural resources. See O'CONNELL, supra note 147, at 16.
151 See KELSEN, supra note 9, at 392.
152 See FRIED, supra note 57, at 90.
153 See KELSEN, supra note 9, at 392 (explaining that "positivity" is based upon
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contract rejects and is inconsistent with coercion. Therefore,
because of the premise that contract is based on free will, this
point necessarily follows from the first.
The problem, however, is that contract-based theorists cannot
escape the presence of coercion. Positivist theories are not free of
coercion and actually lead straight back to coercion-based
models. 154 Professor Kelsen explained it this way:
Positive law is essentially an order of coercion. Unlike the rules
of natural law, its rules are derived from the arbitrary will of
human authority and, for this reason, simply because of the
nature of their source, they cannot have the quality of immediate
self-evidence. The content of the rules of positive law lacks the
inner "necessity" which is peculiar to those of natural law by
virtue of their origin. Rules of positive law do not lay down a
final determination of social relations. They allow for the
possibility that these relations could also be otherwise
determined by other rules of positive law, be it subsequently by
rules of the same, be it simultaneously by rules of another legal
authority. Those whose conduct is regulated in this fashion
cannot be assumed to acquire, with these rules, the conviction
also of their rightness and justice. It is obviously possible that
their actual conduct may differ from what is prescribed by the
rules of positive law. For this reason, coercion becomes an
integral part of positive law. The doctrine which declares
coercion to be an essential characteristic of law is a positivistic
doctrine and is solely concerned with positive law.'55
Professor Kelsen's observation exposes the internal
incoherence of any attempt to use a contract-based model, with its
reliance on autonomy and freedom, to free CIL from the influence
of coercion. CIL is based on the actions of nations, and, therefore,
nations act or respond based on their power, i.e., their status.
Coercion is implicit in status, and status may be viewed as a
positivistic doctrine.
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on freedom of choice (i.e., contract) may seem perplexing. There
seems to be widespread confusion and incoherence in various
attempts to situate coercion in the language of international law.
For example, the positivist view that CIL is free from coercion
directly contradicts Professor Kelsen's observation. The point is
that there is no agreement on such a basic issue as whether natural
law theory or positive law theory incorporates coercion. What is
clear, though, is that coercion appears to be so distasteful that few
want to be associated with it, yet reality prevents coercion from
simply being wished away. Coercion must somehow be
incorporated into any coherent theory.
The inability to accommodate the existence of power and
coercion reflects a larger, irreconcilable tension in international
law.
Two criticisms are often advanced against international law.
One group of critics has accused international law of being too
political in the sense of being too dependent on states' political
power. Another group has argued that the law is too political
because founded on speculative utopias ... . From one
perspective, this criticism highlights the infinite flexibility of
international law, its character as a manipulable fagade for
power politics. From another perspective, the criticism stresses
the moralistic character of international law, its distance from
the realities of power politics. According to the former
criticism, international law is too apologetic to be taken
seriously in the construction of international order. According
to the latter it is too utopian to the identical effect.156
To the extent this observation is valid, a status-based theory
would fall into the apologist camp because it does not describe
what nations ought to do, but that is not the aim of the theory. The
aim is to provide an accurate description of reality.
C. The Historical Fallacy Underlying the Primacy of
Contract Over Status, and Its Ethnocentric Bias
Contract is embraced because it represents enlightenment and
156 See Koskenniemi, supra note 110, at 360 (emphasis in original).
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modernity.' Contract-based ordering is the organizing principle
of contemporary Western societies.' It is not surprising, then,
that international legal theorists would want to view CIL through
the prism of contract; 159 however, viewing modem international
law as a product of contract-based ordering is a historical fallacy.
Modern international law is as much, if not more, the product of
coercion and status.
The nineteenth century was a period of robust development in
what is now considered to be modern international law.' During
that time, the making of international law was deemed to be the
"exclusive province of civilized societies," i.e., Western European
nations and nations settled by Western Europeans."' A leading
commentator of that era stated that the making of such law was
"limited to the civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those
of European origin."' 62 The theorists of that time "asserted further
that international law applied only to the sovereign [S]tates which
comprised the civilized 'family of nations."" 63 The (self-
designated) civilized nations then imposed the law on colonial
subjects in Africa, Asia and South America: the so-called
uncivilized world.'6
These historical facts further expose the flaws with a contract-
based approach to CIL. If only a few nations are entitled to
engage in international law making based on their history, culture,
and ethnicity, then that means law is made as a result of status, not
consent or agreement. If that law is then imposed on others who
did not participate in its making, then the application of law is the
result of power and coercion. Any attempt to justify contract-
157 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 16, 21-23 and accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
160 See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 32-33 (2004).
161 Id. at 53-54.
162 Id. at 54.
163 Id. at 35.
164 See id. at 1-12. Leading casebooks acknowledge this understanding of
international law. See, e.g., DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 50, at 53; CARTER, TRIMBLE &
BRADLEY, supra note 40, at 22-25.
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based theory on the grounds that it is the product of history from
the Age of Enlightenment is misplaced. The historical origins of
international law in general and CIL in particular are inseparable
from coercion and status.165 Thus, referencing Locke and Hobbes
to advance contract-based theory misses the wider fact that the
ability to craft international law was denied to most of the world.
Treatise writers acknowledge that the foundations of modern
international law were based upon a Eurocentric view and that
international law developed in a way that "encouraged and then
reflected [the] subjugation" of non-European people.166  Those
writers happily note that such use of international law has now
been discredited and rejected;167 however, the persistent attempts
to explain CIL through contract may be an unfortunate legacy of
the colonial era. It is true that the social contract theories of
Locke, Hobbes, and others energized and transformed Western
European society,16 and that the Western European nations
viewed each other as equal, autonomous parties capable of
ordering their relationships through agreement.169 These historical
facts, however, have validity only within narrow boundaries. The
Age of Enlightenment was a Western European phenomenon, and
Western European nations denied international law-making to the
non-European world.' To take the principle of contract-based
ordering, which has historical validity only insofar as Western
Europe is concerned, and then extrapolate it to the making of
international law in general ignores the wider historical truths that
expose the fallacy of using a contract-based theory to explain the
formation of CIL. Asserting contract to explain CIL perhaps
reflects an unexamined bias, carrying forward colonial-era
thinking that only Western Europe matters in law-making.
This approach is ironic in that international law attracts those
165 See SHAW, supra note 72, at 4.
166 Id at 38.
167 See id. at 39.
168 See generally Andrew Roberts, 17th Century Models for a Science of Society, in
SOCIAL SCIENCE HISTORY FOR BUDDING THEORISTS (1997) (providing detailed analysis of
social contract theory).
169 See SHAW, supra note 72, at 28.
170 See id at 26-27.
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with a cosmopolitan view-those who wish to escape the confines
of their own domestic structures-and those who shun the narrow
concerns of municipal lawyers. Yet, international legal theorists
who assert contract as the organizing principle of CIL, in effect,
do nothing more than transfer parochial and ethnocentric biases
from the local to the global level. International law did not
develop through a convergence of will between Western Europe
(the colonial powers) and non-Europeans (the colonial objects).
Moreover, not every contemporary society exalts individual will
over collective concerns. The attempt to define CIL by contract,
however, ignores those realities.
D. Two Exercises that Confirm Status as a Valid Theory
If the language of contract is indeed the proper analytical
framework to explain CIL, then its vitality should be apparent in
legal decisions involving CIL. After all, a theory only has validity
to the extent that it is reflected in or has potential application to
actual conditions. To test this thesis, I offer two exercises that
ultimately demonstrate the emptiness of contract-based theory and
the viability of status. The first is an examination of the advisory
opinion issued by the ICJ on The Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons."' The second is a hypothetical exercise
involving the law of the sea, which demonstrates the role of status
in forming CIL.
1. The International Court ofJustice's Advisory Opinion
on the Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear
Weapons
Upon the request of the U.N. General Assembly, the ICJ
addressed the following issue: "Is the threat or use of nuclear
weapons in any circumstance permitted under international
law?"l72 By unanimous vote, the court held: "There is neither in
customary nor conventional international law any specific
authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons."l73 Bya
171 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226 (July 8) [hereinafter Legality of Nuclear Weapons].
172 Id. at 228.
173 Id. at 266.
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vote of eleven to three, the court also held: "There is neither in
customary nor conventional international law any comprehensive
and universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
as such.""'
While the decisions may be interesting, the relevant aspects of
the opinion for purposes of this paper are the court's analysis and
the arguments of interested parties, because the analysis and
arguments referenced CIL to inform the resolution of the question
presented.17 5  If the language of contract has any force or
application, one would expect the opinion to use contract as the
framing structure of the analysis and arguments. Nothing of the
sort is found in the opinion. Contract did not add anything to the
analysis of CIL. In fact, the court identified several norms as
being so important that they bound all nations, whether or not
agreement or assent was present.176 To be sure, there is nothing in
the opinion that states anything like the following: "In arriving at
our opinion, we rely on a status-based view of CIL."
Nevertheless, I contend that an unstated (perhaps even
unrecognized) reliance on status is woven throughout the opinion
and that status provides the coherent structure of the analysis. The
opinion does not appear to rely on a contract-based approach,
which is all the more surprising given that such an approach falls
within the conventional and traditional mainstream.
In the opinion, the court noted two principles of CIL involving
humanitarian principles: (1) States must never make civilians the
object of attack and must never use weapons that are incapable of
distinguishing between civilian and military targets; and (2) States
must not use weapons that cause unnecessary suffering to
combatants.17 7  The court stated that these principles were so
widely accepted and so fundamental to the respect of human rights
that they "are to be observed by all States whether or not they have
ratified the conventions that contain them, because they constitute
irreproachable principles of international customary law."17' The
174 Id.
175 See id. T64.
176 See Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 68, 104.
177 See id. 78.
178 Id. 179.
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court also noted that the principle of neutrality (e.g., the
inviolability of the territory of a neutral State) is a principle of CIL
that is so fundamental that it applies to all nations regardless of
agreement or assent. 179
The essential structure of CIL cannot be based in contract if
some CIL principles are so fundamental that they bind all nations
regardless of agreement or assent. This is, of course, not an
original observation; this concept is the basis of jus cogens.'o The
point is that the ICJ's opinion may be read as an implied (and
probably unintentional) departure from the school of thought that
seeks to describe CIL as a contract-based structure. If contract is
the appropriate framework to view CIL, why was it not used to
analyze the issue?
The dissenting opinion of Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen is
even more interesting for purposes of this thesis because it reflects
is a status-based approach to CIL.'"' Judge Shahabuddeen wrote
his dissent to underscore the historically unprecedented dangers
posed by nuclear weapons.1 82 In so doing, he wrote:
There is not any convincing ground for the view that the "Lotus"
Court moved off the supposition that States have an absolute
sovereignty which would entitle them to do anything however
horrid or repugnant to the sense of the international community,
provided that the doing of it could not be shown to be prohibited
under international law. The idea of internal supremacy
associated with the concept of sovereignty in municipal law is
not applicable when that concept is transposed to the
international plane. The existence of a number of sovereignties
side by side places limits on the freedom of each State to act as
if the others did not exist.1
He went on to add: "It is reasonably clear, however, that the
previous stress on the individual sovereignty of each State as
179 See id 88.
180 See id 83.
181 Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 375 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting).
182 See id. at 393 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting).
183 Id
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hortus conclusus has been inclining before a new awareness of the
responsibility of each State as a member of a more cohesive and
comprehensive system based on co-operation and
interdependence."' 84
Regardless of how one may interpret these broad remarks, one
thing is certain: These remarks are an expression of a view that
international law, including CIL, should not be viewed as a means
for nations (i.e., contracting parties) to pursue individualistic aims
in any manner, for any purpose, so long as no express prohibition
exists. Judge Shahabuddeen's view of international law conflicts
with the view that international law is or should be like the world
of contemporary contract with its emphasis on exchange for
individual gain. His view places the needs of the world as a whole
over the particular needs of individual nations.8"' This is the basis
of status-based societies-the subordination of individual wants to
the welfare of the group. The judge is, of course, just one person,
and one person's particular views may not matter much in the face
of seemingly canonical principles (like CIL as contract).
Nonetheless, the view of this one judge on the ICJ shows that
alternatives to the conventional view may be available.
The dissent is also interesting because it mentions an argument
made by some or all of the so-called Nuclear Weapons States
("NWS"), China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the
United States.1 6 The argument was that the NWS were "states
whose interests are specially affected" and that "a practice
involving the threat or use of nuclear weapons could proceed only
from States recognized as possessing the status of nuclear-weapon
States." 7 The NWS are a perfect example of what Edward Jenks
described as "those comparatively few classes of persons in the
community who, by reason of their conspicuous differences from
normal persons ... require separate consideration in an account of
the law."'"' In effect, the NWS asserted that their status should
184 Id. at 394.
185 See id. at 394-95. Whether such a view should be a normative principle is, of
course, left to individual opinion.
186 These nations have publicly acknowledged possession of nuclear weapons and
are also the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.
187 Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 414 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting).
188 See JENKS, supra note 85, at 109.
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govern the issue.189 How is this different from tribal elders in a
pre-modern village asserting they alone have the authority to
decide life or death matters for the tribe?
The NWS's position rejects the view that CIL may be formed
by any and all nations through their agreement or assent in any
matter of their choosing. It exposes the fictional nature of the
view that all nations have the ability to participate in the formation
of CIL through contract-like behavior. A contract-based view of
CIL only has validity if all nations are equal and free to contract.
As a corollary, contract cannot be the basis of CIL if all nations
are not permitted to agree on its formation. The argument for
contract becomes unattainable if only a handful of nations are
permitted to agree. The NWS states argued, in essence, that the
formation of CIL is based on and inseparable from status.'9 0
Simply put, if only five nations are permitted to form CIL
regarding nuclear weapons, that necessarily means that the right or
ability to agree or assent is denied to all remaining nations. Given
the power and influence of the NWS, this denial raises serious
questions regarding the vitality or usefulness of a contract-based
theory of CIL. How can any theory of international law have
force if the most powerful nations take positions that directly
contradict the theory? If these nations do not adhere to this theory,
what use does it have?
2. A Hypothetical Comparison of Two Sets of Countries
The limit of a nation's territorial sea is well settled today under
international law."' Assume a hypothetical, though, in which the
limit is not established. Suppose the five NWS agreed among
themselves that their territorial sea extends one hundred nautical
miles from their coasts, and further suppose the rest of the world
voiced objection to this agreement. Imagine a different situation.
Suppose Costa Rica, Gabon, Ghana, Honduras, and New Zealand
agreed among themselves that their territorial sea extends one
189 See Legality of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. at 414 (Shahabuddeen, J.,
dissenting).
190 See id.
191 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part II, § 2, art. 3, Dec.
10, 1982 3 U.N.T.S. 397, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). Under current international law, the
territorial sea extends twelve nautical miles from the coast. See id
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hundred nautical miles (one could double the number of states, for
good measure, by adding Fiji, Latvia, Peru, Thailand, and Yemen),
and further suppose the NWS voiced their objection. In which
situation would it be more likely that the one hundred-mile limit
would become CIL? If New Zealand chose to demonstrate its
objection to the new limit set by the NWS by sailing a flag vessel
twenty miles off the coast of China, what would it be able to do in
response to a seizure of its ship by the Chinese navy? Along
similar lines, if the NWS chose to forcibly demonstrate their
objection to the agreement of the smaller countries by sailing their
navies within thirty miles off the smaller countries' coasts, what
could these ten countries do about it? The answer is obvious.
These hypothetical scenarios demonstrate the failure of
contract-based analysis to explain CIL. As seen in this exercise,
agreement is not the dispositive factor underlying the development
of CIL. Both hypothetical situations are based on agreement;
however, it is not agreement that determines whether the one
hundred-mile limit becomes CIL. The outcomes would be entirely
different in the two hypotheticals. Thus, asking whether there is
agreement or not adds little to the analysis. The key issue is which
nations are involved. Thus, whether a principle becomes CIL or
not depends on the identity of the nations asserting the limit. If
which nation or nations assert a legal principle (and not
agreement) determines the outcome, contract is not the ordering
principle. Status is.
V. The Need to Reconcile Status and Contract to
Explain CIL
Critics may object to the use of status to explain CIL on the
grounds that it represents a dark, regressive approach to
international law. Theories implicitly based on force and coercion
are not likely to win adherents among progressive, cosmopolitan
elites (the cohorts that influence international legal theory). There
seems to be a reflexive rejection of status, as if no modern, liberal
thinker should acknowledge any positive aspects to it. The idea of
status as the organizing principle of Western society was relegated
to the dustbin of history upon the dawning of the Age of
Enlightenment.19 2 Thus, the notion of status as having any potency
192 See Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in
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to explain contemporary law or society may simply be too bizarre
for anyone whose life has been experienced exclusively within the
milieu of Western liberalism.
As disquieting as it may be to some, status simply cannot be
wished away. Ignoring it does not push it out of existence. At the
same time, however, I do not want to make the same mistake as
the proponents of the contract-based approach to CIL make; that
is, I do not want to present status in the form of a binary choice,
with status as the only alternative to a state of nature. Instead, I
offer a more textured, nuanced approach to the understanding of
CIL. The formation and theoretical foundation of CIL is not
solely (even largely) based on contract. I contend that CIL cannot
be fully understood or explained without reference to status;
however, I do not go so far as to hold status as the only relevant
paradigm. While I submit that status is at the heart of CIL, I do
not contend that contract has no role in the discussion. The
difficult issue is in determining how much of a role it has. Perhaps
the answer is simple and has remained unchanged since the reality
of the colonial era: Powerful nations arrive at an express or tacit
agreement on a principle of CIL, and weaker nations fall into line
in observance of the principle. This may not be what liberal
theorists have in mind when they advance contract as the
organizing principle of CIL, but this proposition is more accurate
than the assertion that small, weak nations are equal partners with
large, powerful nations in the formation of CIL.
The coexistence of status and contract in contemporary CIL is
amply demonstrated by the nuclear weapons opinion. There is
undoubtedly widespread, if not universal, agreement among
nations that use of nuclear weapons should be avoided.193 At a
minimum, it is fair to assert that the use of nuclear weapons is only
permitted as a last resort has become a principle of CIL, and this
principle is probably the result of agreement. It is equally true,
however, that one or all of the NWS will be involved in and, in
fact, lead any discussion regarding nuclear weapons.'94 In other
Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 2, 6, 8 (1999).
193 See, e.g., supra note 172 and accompanying text.
194 For example, the position of the United States on the use of nuclear weapons is
as follows:
The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapon
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words, status will drive the discussion. Thus, it is unhelpful to an
understanding of CIL to assert that contract alone underlies its
development.
Whether or not CIL is formed as a result of contract or status is
more than a question of theoretical interest. A more nuanced
understanding that incorporates something other than contract may
have actual consequences for the way nations interact. If contract
is the sole or overwhelming determinant in the formation of CIL,
then every principle of CIL is thereby legitimated upon the sole
basis that it is the product of consent. Who are we to question the
product of anyone's agreement? The use of contract thus results
in an empty formalism where every accepted principle of CIL is
deemed legitimate because its formation has complied with the
formality of putative contract formation.
Such a view, in effect, marginalizes and denies a voice to
weaker nations. If CIL is explained and justified through the
language of contract, weaker nations are deemed to have "agreed"
and thus have no right to object to the imposition of CIL
(notwithstanding the somewhat mythical principle of the
"persistent objector"--query whether weak nations are able to
have their persistent objections recognized). If the United States,
the Western European nations, and China were to agree that CIL
did not prohibit actions that raise the level of oceans, then the
contract-based approach would conclude that low-lying island
nations like Fiji and the Seychelles have "agreed" and are bound
by the principle. This is why it is important to acknowledge the
role of status in the development of CIL. Recognizing the role of
status leads to the recognition that not all nations have a role
in shaping, or even in agreeing to, CIL principles. Recognizing
the role of status dismantles the tautology that every principle of
CIL is legitimate because it is the result of agreement.
state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment
not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the
United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to
a nuclear weapon state, or associated with a nuclear weapon state in carrying
out or sustaining the attack.
U.S. DEP. OF STATE, TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/nptl.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
While the United States opposes the proliferation of nuclear weapons, this statement
makes it clear that the United States reserves the right to use them under limited
circumstances.
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Recognizing status's role allows for the understanding that
perhaps nations like Fiji and the Seychelles did not "agree" to any
and all CIL principles decided by others.
There is undoubtedly some irony in the fact that status,
which embodies elements of power and coercion, may actually
empower weak nations. Nonetheless, recognition that the
language of contract may be a disguise to legitimate the imposition
of rules on the weak by the powerful (through the soothing
language of "agreement" and "consent") may eventually lead
theorists back to the first principles of whether the conventional
construct of contract is even legitimate. I contend that the
language of contract is used as a mesmerizing illusion to cloak the
hidden (and distasteful, at least to liberal theorists) elements of
power and coercion. By removing this cloak and accepting and
acknowledging that status is the predominant force in CIL, a more
genuine understanding is possible. Most importantly, this genuine
understanding permits the recognition that weak nations often
have terms dictated to them, and attempts to soften this reality by
saying that the imposition of terms is actually the product of
"consent" are pure fantasy. Such an understanding would actually
permit weak nations to free themselves from the fictional binds of
"consent" and would provide a means to avoid onerous terms
imposed by the powerful. Currently, the analysis of the legitimacy
of CIL seems to work in the following way: Is a principle of law a
part of CIL? If the answer is yes, it necessarily means that the
principle of law was the product of agreement; therefore, it must
be legitimate. Stripping away "agreement" as the
dispositive element permits the analysis to address whether the
principle of law is actually just or desirable. Recognizing the so-
called agreement as the blunt exercise of power and naked self-
interest permits the direct question as to whether a particular
principle of CIL ought to be a part of CIL. This is why contract
should not be the only-or the predominant-framework to
understand CIL.
VI. Conclusion
Many view the development of CIL as an exclusive choice
between state of nature versus contract-based ordering.'95 Yet,
195 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
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contract provides a poor basis for explaining CIL, and even the
proponents of this theory acknowledge its deep flaws. It is
undeniable that the use of contract is based on fiction and fails to
account for political reality. The use of contract can only be valid
if one assumes nations generally possess the capability to
participate equally in the formation or rejection of CIL. Some
nations are more influential and powerful than others and are
simply more important in the international legal process. This has
been the situation throughout history, as seen in the fact that a few
States have participated extensively in the creation of CIL.
Moreover, it is not agreement that is the dispositive feature in the
formation of CIL; the dispositive feature is the identity of the
nations behind its development. Given its obvious failings,
alternatives to a contract-based model must exist. The binary
choice presented by the proponents of a contract-based theory is
an empty choice that fails to describe geopolitical reality.
My goal in this paper has been to demonstrate that the resort to
the language of contract to explain CIL is a crude, even largely
ineffectual, tool that fails in most aspects to provide a coherent
theory to explain CIL. What justifies its continuing vitality?
There could be several factors: (1) The absence of a better
explanatory model (until now, hopefully); (2) cultural bias with
historical roots in Western, contract-based social models; and
(3) contemporary theorists' unfamiliarity with status-based social
ordering, most of whom have exclusively Western experiences.
That said, I do not deny the existence or influence of contract-like
behavior to explain some aspects of CIL; however, I do dispute
any attempt to insist that status is not an equal or even a more
powerful element. It is a false binary choice to argue that CIL is
either contract- or status-based because it is readily apparent that
both are present. Contract-like behavior probably explains much
of the ordering among nations of relatively equal power or shared
cultural roots (such as the United States and Western European
nations). It is pure fiction to suggest that similar ordering explains
the development and application of CIL with respect to weaker
nations or nations that do not share cultural roots. To paraphrase
Thucydides' account of the Melian Dialogue, perhaps it is the case
that the development of CIL is within the domain of the strong,
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and the weak must suffer as CIL is imposed.196 To that extent,
perhaps the world has not progressed as much as liberal theorists
would like to believe since the time of the Peloponnesian War.
Status presents a more coherent and viable theory because it
accurately explains both the historical origins of CIL (as seen in
the colonial relationship between Western European and non-
European nations) and the way in which CIL has been formed
throughout the modern history of international law. Critics of a
status-based theory may argue that it lacks normativity and is
merely descriptive. The defense to this is that status-based theory
provides an accurate description, unlike the forced application of
the ill suited contract-based analysis. If the goal is to influence
international law in a normative fashion, we should at least
understand and describe international law for what it is. There are
more than two ways to describe the world. To that end, the use of
status offers an alternative theory to explain CIL in a way that
contract cannot.
196 See THUCYDIDES, supra note 136.
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